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MEASURING TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
Cortelyou C. Kenney* 
 
Over the past three and a half decades, hundreds of transnational human 
rights civil suits—i.e., suits seeking monetary compensation for atrocities 
committed abroad ranging from torture and extrajudicial killing to forced 
labor and human trafficking—have been filed in the United States.  
Exhaustive qualitative research chronicles plaintiff “successes” and 
“failures” as defined by how frequently plaintiffs win, the magnitude of 
judgments and settlements they obtain, and the extent to which judgments 
and settlements are enforced.  The prevailing wisdom is that while some 
cases have proven runaway successes along these axes, in general, 
transnational human rights suits constitute “a modest enterprise akin to 
personal injury or mass tort suits.”1  Certain commentators argue that 
hostility stemming from “foreignness” and reliance on international law is 
responsible for this underwhelming performance and, in particular, the low 
win rate in transnational suits.2  Commentators point to “avoidance 
doctrines”—such as personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, 
abstention comity, and the presumption against extraterritoriality—
perceived as the most common means of shunting transnational cases as 
evidence of courts’ “isolationism.”3  Other thinkers take the argument a 
step further, claiming hostility toward international law portends the 
demise of human rights in federal courts following the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2013 decision Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel II) 
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 1. Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed:  Civil Human Rights Litigation As a 
Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305, 2317 (2004). 
 2. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1081, 1088–89 
(2015). 
 3. Id. 
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that fundamentally changed the landscape against which these suits are 
litigated.  But no scholar to date has undertaken a systematic, quantitative 
examination of such conclusions to determine whether the numbers actually 
bear them out. 
This Article fills that gap.  It collects a new dataset of all cases and 
opinions filed from 1980 to the present under the two predominant human 
rights civil statutes to scrutinize these claims and lay the groundwork for 
future quantitative analysis.  The data support three findings.  First, the 
transnational human rights enterprise is modest both in terms of how 
frequently plaintiffs prevail and how much money they are entitled to and 
actually do obtain, but not as modest as believed.  Second, any modesty is 
not evidence of courts’ isolationism.  The real doctrines most commonly 
employed to end civil suits prior to Kiobel II suggest that courts do not use 
domestic law avoidance mechanisms designed to prevent consideration of, 
and de facto shun, the application of international law.  Rather, courts 
apply international law, including human rights law, but are conservative 
in their interpretation of it—protecting only certain types of harms 
committed by certain types of actors.  Third, a core group of claims has 
weathered significant doctrinal shifts over time.  Plaintiffs bringing these 
claims are poised to circumvent Kiobel II and are on track to be as 
“successful” or “unsuccessful” as ever. 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1054	
I.  METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 1061	
II.  GENERAL FINDINGS ............................................................................ 1067	
A.  Dismissal Rates ....................................................................... 1068	
B.  Settlement ................................................................................ 1072	
C.  Trials and Default Judgments ................................................. 1074	
D.  Dismissal Grounds .................................................................. 1078	
III.  FINDINGS AND TRENDS OVER EACH TIME PERIOD ........................... 1085	
A.  From Filártiga to the TVPA ..................................................... 1085	
B.  From the TVPA to Kadic ......................................................... 1090	
C.  From Kadic to Sosa ................................................................ 1096	
D.  From Sosa to Kiobel II ........................................................... 1101	
E.  From Kiobel II to the Present ................................................. 1108	
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 1113	
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three and a half decades, hundreds of transnational human 
rights civil suits—i.e., suits seeking monetary compensation for atrocities 
committed abroad ranging from torture and extrajudicial killing to forced 
labor and human trafficking—have been filed in the United States.  Against 
the backdrop of dictatorships and brutal military regimes in place during the 
Cold War, human rights practitioners concluded that U.S. courts were the 
best, or at least the least bad, fora to litigate such abuses because the 
possibility of providing reparations to human rights victims was vanishingly 
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small elsewhere.  Prominent human rights lawyer turned law professor Beth 
Stephens summed up the prevailing sentiment: 
In a more perfect world, none of these human rights victims would have 
chosen to file civil lawsuits in the United States.  But the combined efforts 
of international and domestic legal systems offer very little in the way of 
enforcement or compensation to them or others like them around the 
world.  More importantly, civil litigation in their home countries and 
criminal prosecution of those responsible are both clearly impossible.4 
That the United States was better equipped to dispense this form of 
justice was an assumption not unfounded.  Human rights organizations led 
the charge in the late 1970s and early 1980s, bringing civil suits in the 
United States as part of a broader strategy to hold abusers accountable that 
would eventually include pushing for criminal actions in countries such as 
the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Belgium.5  In 1979, the first 
successful transnational human rights case was filed under a little known 
part of the U.S. Code called the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which entitles 
aliens to civil damages for violations of the law of nations.6  The family of a 
young Paraguayan who had been kidnapped, tortured, and killed by his 
country’s dictatorship filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against 
	
 4. Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 485, 486 (2001) (discussing the initial reasons advocates filed in the United States, 
including both substantive and procedural advantages of the U.S. legal system over those of 
foreign nations and the fact that the United States had become a haven for many human 
rights abusers); see also Roxanna Altholz, Chronicle of a Death Foretold:  The Future of 
U.S. Human Rights Litigation Post-Kiobel, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2014) (explaining 
that current victims seek justice in the United States given a relative lack of corruption); 
Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil 
Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 149 (2006) (arguing that the United States is a superior 
forum for human rights victims because victims themselves can initiate individual cases 
without the buy-in of the government as part of the public law system); Cortelyou Kenney, 
Disaster in the Amazon:  Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights 
Litigation, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 857, 861–62 n.23, 864 n.31 (2009) (collecting additional 
sources in support of the continuing, though possibly mistaken, belief that the United States 
is the strongest forum to litigate human rights claims). 
 5. Altholz, supra note 4, at 1498. 
 6. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–80 (2d Cir. 1980).  The ATS provides:  
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Judiciary 
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)). 
   According to Professor Kenneth Randall, approximately twenty-one ATS cases were 
filed between the statute’s enactment and the Filártiga decision, with courts twice finding 
jurisdiction. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims:  
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4 & n.15, 5 & n.16 
(1985).  Of the two cases where courts found jurisdiction, the first failed for lack of evidence 
to support the violation, see Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), and the second 
was Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795), in which the court sustained 
jurisdiction for the ATS but held that a treaty with France altered the outcome of the case, id. 
at 811.  There are still other decisions not cited by Professor Randall in which courts found 
that there was jurisdiction but dismissed the case for other reasons. E.g., O’Reilly De 
Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1908) (dismissing claim for cattle slaughter because 
defendant was a U.S. actor whose actions were ratified by the U.S. government conferring 
immunity from suit under the ATS). 
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the officer allegedly responsible for these acts, then living in Brooklyn.7  
The family had first pressed criminal charges in Paraguay, but the 
Paraguayan police issued a death threat to their lawyer.8  In Filártiga v. 
Peña-Irala,9 the Second Circuit held that the ATS gave U.S. district courts 
jurisdiction to remedy violations of the law of nations committed abroad 
against foreign nationals by officials acting “under color of government 
authority.”10  After Filártiga, the ATS became the most important method 
of bringing human rights civil suits in the United States and, arguably, the 
world.11 
Much ink has been spilt on the “successes” and “failures” of plaintiffs in 
cases brought under the ATS and other similar statutes, such as the Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 199112 (TVPA).  In many senses these cases have 
been successful:  most scholars and practitioners agree that these laws are 
symbolically and psychologically important because they validate victims’ 
experiences even when no money damages are awarded.13  They also point 
to judgments and settlements ranging from the tens of millions to the 
billions of dollars obtained in ATS and TVPA cases dealing with torture, 
forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and massacres perpetrated by 
dictators and their agents.  Examples include judgments against Indonesian, 
Guatemalan, Salvadoran, Argentine, and Chilean generals, the Philippine 
dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the Haitian dictator Prosper Avril, an Ethiopian 
official, and the former mayor of Beijing.14  Plaintiffs also increasingly 
	
 7. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878–80. 
 8. Id. at 879. 
 9. 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980). 
 10. Id. at 881, 890. 
 11. Compare HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS 33–35 (2008) (arguing that human rights advocates became warriors in the name of 
violations abroad as civil rights lawyers did in the name of ending segregation and other 
racially biased policies), with Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in 
Non-U.S. Courts:  A Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127, 136 (2013) 
(contrasting ATS litigation with similar litigation in other locations, such as the United 
Kingdom). 
 12. The TVPA is an amendment to the ATS that allows suits to be brought not only by 
aliens but also by U.S. citizens against individuals acting under color of law who commit 
torture or extrajudicial killing. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)). 
  As of June 2014, there were just shy of 4500 law review articles that mentioned the 
Alien Tort Statute. Altholz, supra note 4, at 1500 n.21. 
 13. BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 
xvii–xviii (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that even filing suits is often satisfying to plaintiffs where 
defendants are forced to leave the United States or answer for atrocities and that such actions 
can promote awareness of human rights abuses).  Professor Koh enumerates five “successes” 
of transnational suits:  “compensation of victims; denial of safe haven to the defendant in the 
judgment-rendering forum; deterrence of others who might contemplate similar conduct; and 
enunciation of legal norms opposing the conduct for which the defendant has been found 
liable.” KOH, supra note 11, at 25–26 (emphasis omitted).  Professor Koh lists an additional, 
final objective:  “revision of illegal government policies.” Id. at 26. But see Beth Stephens, 
The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2014) 
(characterizing ATS cases as having “modest practical import”). 
 14. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 13, at 13–14 (collecting cases). 
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bring transnational human rights civil suits against corporations.15  While 
no court has upheld a jury verdict against a corporate defendant, expensive 
settlements combined with even more expensive attorneys’ fees exert 
pressure on defendants to modify their behavior to avoid payouts or the 
potential publicity nightmare that might ensue.16 
Yet even the most ardent supporters of transnational human rights suits 
concede that “the direct economic benefit to individual plaintiffs has been 
limited[] [and] [f]ew ATS plaintiffs have received monetary compensation 
from their perpetrators.”17  One prominent human rights litigator turned law 
professor has noted that, in terms of financial payouts, ATS litigation may 
be seen as a “modest enterprise, akin to personal injury or mass tort 
suits”18—a somewhat pessimistic outlook given that many of the most 
important mass tort cases have “failed, at times in spectacular fashion.”19  
But all agree that pursuing such claims is a long and arduous path, often 
resulting in decades’ worth of litigation, hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions, of dollars in attorney labor, or in dismissal or failure to enforce 
judgments awarded.20  For example, the trial court awarded the Filártiga 
family nearly $10.4 million in damages based on Paraguayan, U.S., and 
international law.21  The judgment was never collected.22 
Certain scholars attribute this lack of success—both in terms of verdicts 
rendered and in terms of damages and settlements awarded and collected—
to the “foreignness” of such lawsuits.23  One thinker dubs the phenomenon 
“litigation isolationism” and concludes that domestic civil procedural 
	
 15. Goldhaber, supra note 11, at 128. 
 16. Id. at 128–29. 
 17. Altholz, supra note 4, at 1500 & n.24, 1501 & n.25 (collecting scholarly commentary 
in support of this proposition). 
 18. Van Schaack, supra note 1, at 2317.  Professor Beth Van Schaack also observes that 
ATS advocates seek to “produce lasting and systematic changes in countries where human 
rights violations occur” and that the private bar later began to bring such suits and sought 
attorneys’ fees. Id. at 2517; see also Stephens, supra note 13, at 1467 (noting the “modest” 
impact of ATS suits). 
 19. David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1950 & 
n.4 (2008) (explaining the difficulty of obtaining successful mass tort judgments). 
 20. KOH, supra note 11, at 40 n.88. 
 21. Id. at 34, 35 n.18. 
 22. Id.  One problem, among many, that advocates have faced is uncovering where 
assets are located if defendants hide them in offshore bank accounts and in countries that do 
not extend comity to U.S. judgments. 
 23. See Bookman, supra note 2, at 1081; see also Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping 
Federal Law in Transnational Cases:  The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 
N.C. L. REV. 995, 998 (2015); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and 
Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2010).  Prior to conducting this 
quantitative study, I held a similar belief, writing that: 
[While the] number of human rights lawsuits filed in the United States against 
multinational corporate entities has skyrocketed . . . U.S. courts have displayed a 
marked reluctance to hear such cases, in part due to the heavy administrative 
burden they impose—for example, resulting from the challenges of managing 
foreign plaintiffs and witnesses, translation requirements, and extensive 
documentation—and in part due to the complex and unfamiliar questions of 
transnational and international law they raise. 
Kenney, supra note 4, at 861–62. 
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“avoidance doctrines” such as personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, 
abstention comity, and the presumption against extraterritoriality that she 
believes are used to dismiss transnational cases in favor of defendants “all 
speak to the nexus between the United States, the parties, and a given 
suit.”24  Other academics and practitioners argue that the surge in 
conservative scholarship and Department of State’s position on the ATS 
under George W. Bush “mirror debates about international law” that have 
become volatile as corporate defendants and U.S. officials are increasingly 
the targets of these suits.25  And still other commentators take the argument 
a step further and contend that a recent Supreme Court decision, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.26 (Kiobel II), embodies growing hostility 
toward transnational human rights suits and portends their imminent demise 
in federal courts.27 
Although qualitative, and some limited or unpublished empirical, 
research supports the conclusions above, no scholar to date has undertaken 
a systematic, quantitative examination to determine whether the numbers 
actually bear them out.28  Such a study is important not solely as a 
descriptive tool, but also as a predictive one.  How did major decisions—
	
 24. Bookman, supra note 2, at 1084 & n.18.  Bookman defines “abstention comity” as 
the power to abstain based on international comity concerns.  She also lists “the act of 
state . . . , standing, and the limited enforcement of non-self-executing treaties” doctrines as 
“transnational litigation avoidance doctrines.” Id.; see also id. at 1084 n.17.  This Article 
does not address potential critiques of Bookman’s characterization of these doctrines, such 
as the argument that personal jurisdiction is constitutionally rooted in access to due process. 
 25. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 13, at 1468. 
 26. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 27. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation:  The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1577 (2014) (suggesting that because the ATS is based on international law, 
the presumption of extraterritoriality may limit the application of the statute in the future).  
Many scholars believe other avenues for relief exist. See infra note 33. 
 28. Certain human rights resource centers and advocates used to or do keep informal 
lists of past and pending ATS cases. See Susan Simpson, Alien Tort Statute Cases Resulting 
in Plaintiff Victories, VIEW FROM LL2, http://viewfromll2.com/2009/11/11/alien-tort-statute-
cases-resulting-in-plaintiff-victories/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (keeping a running list of 
all ATS cases that “have resulted in something other than complete failure for the plaintiffs 
who have brought the claims”) [http://perma.cc/BF6K-UM3S].  Some scholars, such as 
Professor Stephens, have purported to possess data related to all ATS suits. See, e.g., Beth 
Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, 33 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773, app. at 810–12 (2008) (stating that 185 cases were filed between 
Filártiga and 2008, and providing a brief summary of findings, but no dataset and no in-
depth analysis of the cases).  Finally, attorney Jonathan Drimmer, in collaboration with 
Professor Michael Goldhaber, has gathered perhaps the most extensive collection of data.  
The Appendix to Professor Goldhaber’s article lists past and pending cases against corporate 
defendants, the year and jurisdiction where the case was filed, and the disposition, if any. 
Goldhaber, supra note 11, at 137–49.  Very rarely, the Appendix summarily lists the grounds 
for dismissal. See, e.g., id. at 139.  Recently, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce released a 
study of lower court cases post-Kiobel II. JOHN B. BELLINGER III & R. REEVES ANDERSON, 
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, AS KIOBEL TURNS TWO:  HOW THE SUPREME COURT 
IS LEAVING THE DETAILS TO LOWER COURTS (2015), http://www.instituteforlegalreform. 
com/uploads/sites/1/Kiobel_v6.pdf [http://perma.cc/CN3N-S47S].  While as a preliminary 
matter the authors do not release the raw data and do not explain their methodology, they 
also appear not to account for newly filed cases not on Westlaw.  Finally, certain claims are 
erroneous, as can be seen from the data I make publicly available with this Article. 
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especially at the circuit and Supreme Court levels—change the strategies 
adopted by transnational human rights advocates, and how might these 
strategies change again in the wake of the most recent ripples in 
transnational human rights litigation?  Using suits under the ATS and 
TVPA as proxies for transnational human rights claims more generally,29 
this Article fills the gap and lays the groundwork for future quantitative 
analysis.  I gather a new dataset of approximately one thousand opinions 
that reference these statutes.  Using this dataset, I analyze the “successes” 
and “failures” narrowly defined by the win rate for human rights plaintiffs 
in nonfrivolous, non pro se suits; the magnitude of damages awarded and 
settlements obtained in these cases; and whether these judgments and 
settlements are enforced where such data are publicly available.30  I 
examine trends in these “successes” and “failures” over time, the doctrines 
most commonly used to terminate such suits, and how these doctrines have 
changed, among other observations.  After analyzing the data, I offer some 
thoughts on the future of the trends illustrated. 
Part I presents the methodology used to collect and analyze data 
surrounding these suits.  While some datasets partially collect cases 
litigated under the ATS or TVPA,31 they often represent fragments of ATS 
and TVPA suits based on the window of time the author has examined and, 
for the most part, do not trace these cases beyond the appellate or Supreme 
Court decisions included in Westlaw or Lexis.  This Article is the first to 
analyze not only all relevant cases since 1980 but also over seven hundred 
dispositive and nondispositive opinions produced along the way.  (Although 
I tabulate approximately three hundred additional irrelevant, pro se, and 
frivolous cases, this Article does not analyze them.)  It also is the first to 
trace cases through their entire lifecycles, including, for example, voluntary 
dismissals and quashed motions to enforce judgments.  Finally, it is the first 
to break the cases down based on the components listed above and many 
others, providing additional information for future scholars to mine. 
Part II discusses two general findings.  First, the transnational human 
rights enterprise is—mostly—modest from a monetary perspective.  Courts 
tend to dismiss roughly 65 to 80 percent of these cases at the pleading stage, 
and only a handful of cases have led to default judgments or jury verdicts 
for the plaintiffs.  While the size of judgments has been enormous, almost 
none have been collected in full.  Further, while most ATS settlements 
eclipse their civil rights counterparts, only 7 percent of human rights cases 
settle.  Nevertheless, the enterprise becomes more lucrative than originally 
thought as the magnitude and number of judgments and settlements 
	
 29. I employ them as proxies because they represent the overwhelming majority of such 
claims. 
 30. To the extent that ATS suits have had symbolic value for victims or have enabled or 
catalyzed policy changes abroad, these outcomes would most certainly count as “successful” 
and, indeed, likely more so than simple monetary awards.  Nevertheless, such results would 
be extremely difficult to analyze from a quantitative perspective and are not the focus of this 
Article, which solely examines “success” from a financial perspective. 
 31. See supra note 28. 
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increases over time and creative shifts in human rights suits post-Kiobel II 
emerge. 
Second, the data show that the freestanding grounds typically thought to 
terminate these suits are different from those imagined.  Courts rarely rely 
on domestic civil procedure “avoidance doctrines” that allegedly show U.S. 
courts not only fail to engage international law, but have an affirmative 
allergy to it.  The primary grounds courts employ to shunt such suits 
illustrate courts are willing to engage international law qua international 
law—they are simply conservative in defining human rights doctrines.  In 
rejecting most plaintiffs’ claims, courts actively grapple with what harms 
are prohibited by the law of nations32 and how severe the harms must be to 
be protected under international law.  Courts also look to the identity of the 
defendants and examine applicable immunity doctrines—including 
sovereign immunity, head-of-state immunity, diplomatic immunity, and the 
like—that are staples of international law. 
Part III introduces the third major finding.  It analyzes cases over five 
discrete periods bookended by major doctrinal changes.  It demonstrates 
that early suits were framed differently than later suits and that the types of 
successful suits mutated over time, perhaps due to Supreme Court decisions 
and important decisions from certain courts of appeals.  For example, the 
particular causes of action and forms of pleading used by plaintiffs, the 
types of defendants against which suits were filed, and plaintiffs’ responses 
to certain defenses changed over each of these periods.  At the same time, 
plaintiffs have been able to weather intra-doctrinal shifts, and a core group 
of claims has remained actionable throughout the entire thirty-five year 
window.  Even when bringing some of these claims became more difficult 
as doctrines narrowed, the success rate was, and remains, fairly constant. 
After analyzing the data, this Article concludes by suggesting that 
transnational human rights suits are not dead—even if brought against 
corporations or other private parties not acting “under color of law.”  
Plaintiffs may have a substantially more difficult time post-Kiobel II, but 
with careful pleading, case, and party selection, they may still be able to 
carry the day, just as they have always adapted to new doctrinal wrinkles.  
Other creative means of bringing such suits under different human rights 
statutes or other causes of action may also arise.33  In sum, we should not 
	
 32. This phrase was core to the Supreme Court’s second encounter with the Alien Tort 
Statute, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), but lower courts grappled with its 
contours for many years before and after it.  As such, I use it as shorthand for what some 
scholars refer to as the “Sosa defense” because the data illustrate that the defense arose long 
before Sosa. 
 33. See generally Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel:  Choice of Law and the 
Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089 (2014) (advocating the 
application of foreign law to human rights claims); Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, 
International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 9 (2013) (suggesting that what would have been ATS claims will be pursued as claims 
under state law). 
  Nevertheless, claims under state and foreign law against foreign defendants are now 
subject to another decision that arguably limits their scope.  In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the 
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pronounce the death of transnational human rights suits and should 
certainly not conclude that courts have shut their doors toward international 
law even as they narrowly interpret it. 
I.  METHODOLOGY 
This Article approaches the successes and failures of transnational human 
rights through an empirical lens.  I gathered all known ATS and TVPA 
opinions in federal court since 1980 through a search in Westlaw for case 
citations to the sections of the U.S. Code where the statutes are codified.34  I 
then parsed the approximately one thousand opinions down by reading the 
cases and eliminating those where the statutes were merely discussed or 
mentioned and keeping those where the statute or statutes were relied upon 
as a cause or causes of action or basis for federal jurisdiction.  I further 
eliminated frivolous lawsuits defined in reference to a court’s own 
characterization of the claim, or suits where the plaintiff was pro se,35 or, in 
cases under the ATS, where the plaintiff was not an alien.  I also treated 
multidistrict litigation as distinct cases if the cases had individual docket 
numbers; I listed them once if all docket numbers were the same (i.e., not 
double counted).  Finally, I coded opinions in a single case based on which 
opinion was outcome determinative:  I marked nondispositive opinions36 as 
“relevant” (R), and I marked final adjudications as “yes” (Y) if the case had 
	
Supreme Court in another 9-0 decision confronted a personal jurisdiction case where the 
plaintiffs brought claims under California and Argentine law for wrongful death as well as 
under the ATS and the TVPA for torture and forced disappearances. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).  
During oral argument, counsel for the plaintiffs conceded that it would be an “uphill 
struggle” to win the ATS claims, but stated they could pursue claims under California’s 
long-arm statute.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-
965).  The Court ruled that finding general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation 
simply because its U.S. subsidiary transacted business in a state violates the Due Process 
Clause “given the absence of any [state] connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims 
described in the complaint.” Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 751. 
 34. Some scholars have criticized the use of Westlaw to gather random samples of data 
related to issues such as dismissal rates. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal 
Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1209 n.24, 1215 & 
nn.44–45 (2013).  Whether these complaints apply to a dataset of all cases is unclear.  
Professor David Engstrom suggests that dismissal rates may appear lower if data from 
PACER are taken into account because judges are much less likely to write a published 
opinion should the motion be denied. Cf. id. at 1209 n.24.  However, we know ATS cases 
rarely make it to the summary judgment stage because if such motions are denied, the cases 
may result in trial, and ATS commentators have paid close attention to the trials that have 
been held.  Contrarily, if summary judgment motions are granted, then the case generally 
results in a published opinion. But see Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish:  The Electronic 
Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 130 
(conducting a study of eight district courts and noting that only 40 percent of summary 
judgment opinions are available on an electronic database).  The data take account of all 
settlements.  Thus the only other outcome is that a case dies after surviving a motion to 
dismiss, which is likely a fairly rare occurrence. 
 35. All fully resolved pro se cases that relied on the ATS were dismissed.  Some pro se 
cases are still pending. 
 36. I counted dispositive opinions with respect to the determination of the ATS and 
TVPA claims.  For example, if the court dismissed all ATS and TVPA claims from a suit, 
this opinion would be dispositive even if other causes of action were allowed to proceed. 
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been resolved or “ongoing litigation” (OL) if the case is still pending.37  
Cases that are deemed irrelevant because they discuss, but do not rely on, 
the ATS as a cause of action were marked “no” (N).  Pro se (PS) and 
frivolous (FL) were notated as well. 
I next broke down each of the remaining seven hundred opinions by the 
year resolved or issued; the jurisdiction in which it was brought; the 
particular cause or causes of action it relied on; the type of defendant 
against which it was brought (i.e., individual, official, state, agency, 
corporation, or other entity); the disposition of the case (i.e., a victory for 
the defendant(s) or plaintiff(s) or a settlement); the stage of the case at 
which it was resolved (i.e., a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary 
judgment, a jury trial, a default judgment, etc.); the ground on which the 
case was resolved (including multiple grounds); the basic facts of the case; 
the causes of action alleged; any major aspects of the opinion or opinions in 
the case, including important dicta; if the case resolved in favor of the 
plaintiff(s), what damages were awarded, if any; and, if damages were 
awarded, whether the judgment was enforced, taking into account appeals 
and collateral challenges to the judgments.  In addition, I determined which 
cases settled and, based on any publicly available information such as news 
articles, the amount of the settlement if such information was available.  
The settled cases are marked “SET” in the disposition column. 
Unlike the limited existing datasets, after first identifying the cases 
through a Westlaw search, I followed up by examining each case’s docket 
sheet on Bloomberg Law.  This step was crucial to identify, for example, 
the outcome of a case that had been remanded after an appeal or dismissed 
on a motion to dismiss with leave to amend or where a default judgment 
was collaterally challenged upon collection efforts—aspects of a case that 
go to its ultimate economic “success.”  In a few instances, I supplemented 
the data on Westlaw and Bloomberg with data derived from other sources.  
The supplemental data comprise only a tiny fraction of the overall dataset.  
Finally, I collected cases filed post-Kiobel II through a search in Bloomberg 
of the section of the U.S. Code in which the ATS and TVPA are codified. 
Although I collected data related to all ATS and TVPA cases filed from 
1980 through the present, I also broke them down by time period based on 
events likely to have influenced the manner in which such cases were 
litigated or treated by the courts.  The first period I examine in this Article 
is 1980 to 1992, i.e., starting with the year Filártiga came down and ending 
with the year the TVPA went into effect.  Soon after Filártiga, the D.C. 
Circuit, in a 1-1-1 split in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,38 dismissed a 
case alleging that the Libyan government, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), and other groups seized two Israeli buses as well as a 
	
 37. I counted cases as ongoing where motions to dismiss were granted, the court granted 
leave to file an amended complaint, and the amended complaint is pending.  These cases are 
marked as “OL” in the dataset.  Additionally, cases where an appeal, a motion for 
reconsideration, or a petition for certiorari are pending are counted as “OL.” 
 38. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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taxi, torturing and shooting their riders.39  The per curiam section gave no 
reason for the dismissal; instead, Judge Bork’s concurrence, which 
questioned the underlying nature of the ATS, became the widespread 
argument against Filártiga.40  Judge Bork questioned the premise that the 
ATS gives rise to a cause of action against defendants for violating the law 
of nations, opined that the ATS was of a purely jurisdictional nature, and 
reasoned that to construe it otherwise would render all U.S. treaties—past, 
present, and future—self-executing, a premise rejected under black letter 
law.41  He also argued that courts should not infer a cause of action under 
customary international law.42 
In 1991, partially in response to Tel-Oren and the growing number of 
ATS suits, Congress enacted the TVPA.  The TVPA provides a statutory 
cause of action for victims of torture and summary execution regardless of 
their citizenship against any official acting under color of law if the plaintiff 
first exhausts local remedies and sues within ten years of the violation.43  
Most commentators agree that the TVPA “affirmed the importance of the 
[ATS] and indicated ‘it should not be replaced.’”44  Nevertheless, they note 
that the TVPA did not significantly expand the scope of transnational 
human rights cases beyond the citizenship aspect.45  The prevailing wisdom 
is that most cases alleging these types of harm were filed under both 
statutes and that the TVPA provided a fallback option in jurisdictions where 
ATS victories were harder to achieve. 
The next period I divide the data into is from 1992 to 1995, i.e., from the 
year the TVPA went into effect until another well-known Second Circuit 
decision, Kadic v. Karadžić.46  The defendant in Kadic was the head of an 
insurgent group that de facto controlled parts of the unrecognized 
Republika Srpska during the Bosnian War and that helped perpetrate the 
genocide there.47  The court held that private actors such as the defendant 
could also be held liable under the ATS even if not acting under color of 
law—but only for certain violations of the law of nations.48  The prevailing 
wisdom is that, after Kadic, suits that were previously thought untenable—
	
 39. Id. at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 40. See Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action, 1 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 421, 427–29 (2000). 
 41. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810–20 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 42. Id.  According to Professor Bradley’s reading of subsequent law, the Supreme Court 
later agreed with the first argument, finding a presumption that treaties do not confer a 
private right of action. CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 
207 n.43 (2013) (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008)). 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2 (2012).  The TVPA also contains extensive and highly 
specific definitions of torture and summary execution. Id. note § 3.  
 44. KOH, supra note 11, at 36 n.59 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 1 (1991)). 
 45. Philip Mariani, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between the Alien Tort Statute 
and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1392 n.50, 1428–29 (2008) 
(citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–5 (1991)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3–4 (1992), 
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86. 
 46. 707 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 47. Id. at 232. 
 48. Id. at 239.  The Court did not extend its holding to the TVPA. Id. 
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i.e., those against private actors, including corporations—began to be filed 
in relatively large numbers.49  Indeed, immediately after Kadic, the first 
case alleging jurisdiction against a corporation for a noncommercial tort 
was filed:  Doe I v. Unocal Corp.50  The case involved a multinational oil 
giant acting in Myanmar.51  The plaintiffs argued that the company and its 
partners knew that the country’s military “use[d] violence and intimidation 
to relocate whole villages, enslave farmers[,] . . . and steal . . . property for 
the benefit of [the oil] pipeline.”52  According to the plaintiffs, this conduct 
caused “the [villagers] to suffer death of family members, assault, rape and 
other torture, forced labor, and the loss of their homes and property, in 
violation of state law, federal law, and customary international law.”53 
The third time period is 1996 to 2004, from Kadic through a Supreme 
Court decision following up on some of the issues raised in Filártiga.  
Filártiga had not defined the “law of nations,” though it did specify that the 
phrase’s meaning must be determined by present-day international norms, 
not international norms as they stood at the passage of the first Judiciary 
Act.54  In 2004—after more than two decades of debate in the lower federal 
courts as to the precise contours of what sorts of transnational human rights 
suits were actionable—the Supreme Court finally weighed in with Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machaín.55  The plaintiff, Humberto Alvarez-Machaín, was a 
Mexican doctor who allegedly had participated in the torture and killing of 
a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent by prolonging his 
life during torture sessions.56  After the Mexican government refused to 
extradite Alvarez-Machaín, stating he would be prosecuted in Mexico,57 the 
	
 49. See Sandra Coliver et al., Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using 
International Law in U.S. Courts:  Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 208 (2005). 
 50. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., No 2:96-cv-06959 (C.D. Cal Oct. 3, 1996).  Wiwa v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 1:296-cv-08386 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1996), was filed one 
month later. 
 51. Doe I v. Unocal Corp. (Unocal I), 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, Doe I v. Unocal Corp. (Unocal II), 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal 
dismissed per stipulation en banc, Doe I v. Unocal Corp. (Unocal III), 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 
2005).  I refer to the country as Myanmar rather than Burma because the court of appeals 
referred to it as such.  I do not wish to imply any political stance through such use. 
 52. Id.  Prior to Unocal I, other cases advanced the theory that corporations could be 
held liable for violations of the law of nations—to no avail.  For example, in Canadian 
Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compañía de Acero Del Pacífico S.A., a dispute arose over whether a 
Chilean company was a “foreign entity” under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 
and thus whether the court had jurisdiction over it. 528 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 
727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984).  The court held it could not exercise jurisdiction and, in 
passing, stated that the plaintiff’s reliance on the ATS was also insufficient to obtain 
jurisdiction over the defendant because “commercial violations . . . do not constitute 
violations of international law.” Id. at 1347 (citing Verlinder B.V. v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 325 n.16 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
 53. Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 883. 
 54. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 55. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 56. Id. at 697. 
 57. United States v. Alvarez-Machaín, 504 U.S. 655, 670–71 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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DEA hired Mexican nationals to kidnap him and bring him to the United 
States, where he was detained and tried.58  The trial court acquitted 
Alvarez-Machaín, and he sued Sosa, one of the men who abducted him, as 
well as other Mexican citizens, DEA agents, and the United States itself 
under the ATS.59  The district court dismissed the U.S. defendants but 
awarded Alvarez-Machaín $25,000.60  The Ninth Circuit affirmed in a 
panel decision and on en banc review, holding that the ATS accepted a 
“clear and universally recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and 
detention.”61  In Sosa, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, 
proclaiming:  “[T]here are good reasons for a restrained conception of the 
discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of 
action of this kind.”62  The Court elaborated that while the tort must be a 
violation of the present-day law of nations, such law must be “accepted by 
the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features 
of the 18th-century paradigms” such as piracy, violations of safe conduct, 
and offenses against ambassadors.63  The Court then ruled that Alvarez-
Machaín’s claim did not pass this test because he had been detained for 
“less than a day,” was then transferred to the “custody [of] lawful 
authorities,” and had a “prompt arraignment.”64  Commentators debate 
whether Sosa raised the bar set by Filártiga—cabining or expanding the 
claims considered violations of the law of nations.65 
The fourth major time period is 2004 to 2013, from the year when the 
Supreme Court decided Sosa up until another pathmaking Supreme Court 
decision on the ATS.  On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a 
unanimous opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.66 (Kiobel II).  
The plaintiffs alleged that the oil company and its partners “enlisted the 
Nigerian Government to violently suppress [] burgeoning demonstrations” 
against the “environmental effects” of the consortium’s operations and 
accused the companies of “aiding and abetting” the Nigerian military and 
police forces, which killed, beat, raped, and arrested the protestors.67  
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that because the 
plaintiffs, the defendants, and the alleged violations of the law of nations 
were outside the United States, the case did not “touch and concern” the 
United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
	
 58. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 699. 
 61. Id. (quoting Alvarez-Machaín v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 62. Id. at 725. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 738. 
 65. See Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín:  “The Door Is Still Ajar” for Human 
Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 533–34 (2005) (predicting that Sosa 
would not affect the success of ATS suits); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt 
Critique to Rest:  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín and the Future of International Human Rights 
Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2293 (2004) (arguing Sosa was a boon, 
not a bust, for ATS plaintiffs). 
 66. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co (Kiobel II), 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).   
 67. Id. at 1662–63. 
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extraterritoriality embedded in all statutes.68  The presumption embodies 
the principle that U.S. law applies within the territorial boundaries of the 
United States “but does not rule the world.”69  The presumption is displaced 
if a statute provides a “clear indication of an extraterritorial application,”70 
such as the provision giving U.S. courts jurisdiction over genocide, no 
matter where committed, if the “alleged offender is, among other things, 
‘present in the United States.’”71  The Court explained the principle behind 
the presumption:  to “protect against unintended clashes between our laws 
and those of other nations which could result in international discord.”72  
Neither the text nor the history of the ATS indicated that jurisdiction should 
attach on the facts there given their lack of nexus to the United States.73  
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence to emphasize that “[o]ther 
cases may arise [under the law of nations] . . . covered neither by the TVPA 
nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s case” that may warrant 
additional “elaboration and explanation.”74  Justice Breyer, who wrote for 
Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concurred in the judgment.  
Justice Breyer argued that jurisdiction under the ATS should attach, under 
certain circumstances, even to events that occurred abroad—for example, 
where the defendant is a U.S. national.75  Nevertheless, even Justice Breyer 
argued that jurisdiction should be “consistent with those notions of comity 
that lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by 
limiting the reach of its own laws and their enforcement.”76  In this case, he 
agreed with the majority that there was an insufficient nexus because mere 
corporate presence in the form of a NYSE listing or public relations office 
does not suffice for jurisdiction.77  Justice Alito, writing for himself and 
Justice Thomas, concurred.78  He argued that suits under the ATS are only 
viable if the conduct is exclusively within the United States.79 
	
 68. Id. at 1669. 
 69. Id. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)). 
 70. Id. at 1664. 
 71. Id. at 1665 (citing and quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). 
 72. Id. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
 73. See id. at 1669. 
 74. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan 
concurred in the judgment, arguing instead for a disjunctive test finding jurisdiction where 
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American 
national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an 
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in 
preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as 
criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind. 
Id. at 1670–71 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 75. See id. at 1671. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1670–71. 
 78. Id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. at 1669–70. 
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The last period is Kiobel II onward, i.e., 2013 to 2015.80  Although not 
much time has passed since Kiobel II, many cases have been resolved in its 
wake.  This Article captures the outcomes and important opinions since 
then.  It does not run statistical regression analyses to predict the future of 
such cases because there are not enough data to accurately do so and, even 
if there were, the sheer number of variables and the inability to capture 
behavioral changes affected by such variables make the task virtually 
impossible.  Instead, this Article offers informed speculation as to the future 
of transnational human rights suits.  The rest of my findings are based on 
tabulation.  Any inferences drawn regarding the factors that influence them 
are again based on informed guesswork. 
II.  GENERAL FINDINGS 
Based on the dataset and a narrow metric of “success” defined in 
reference to the frequency of plaintiff wins, the amount of monetary awards 
and settlements reached, and whether these awards and settlements were 
enforced, this Article concludes that the consensus that ATS and TVPA 
suits are a modest enterprise is mostly correct.81  In reaching this 
determination, I examine a variety of factors:  dismissal rates at the motion 
to dismiss stage; settlement rates and amounts; and default judgments and 
trials.82  The data show that the majority of suits are dismissed at the 
pleading stage, an aberration from other areas of law where motions to 
dismiss are only filed in a tiny fraction of federal cases, including those 
with gruesome fact patterns resembling ATS and TVPA cases.83  It is also 
correct that the settlement rate for ATS and TVPA cases is low relative to 
civil rights suits, and therefore the economic gains of these settlements are 
blunted.84  Nevertheless, the total magnitude of known settlement amounts 
increased over time as well, with the exception of the latest (and shortest) 
period in which there have been, by definition, fewer opportunities for 
settlements to arise.85  The magnitude of ATS and TVPA judgments and 
settlements is also higher as a general matter than civil rights cases, even if 
they are unenforceable or at least have not been enforced up through the 
present.86  Thus, the ATS and TVPA are perhaps more economically viable 
than typically thought.87 
	
 80. The data are current through November 12, 2015, when this Article was sent to 
press. 
 81. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 82. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 83. See infra Part II.A. 
 84. See infra Part II.B. 
 85. See infra Part II.B. 
 86. Judgments obtained under the ATS that have not yet been enforced are not 
necessarily permanently unenforceable.  If plaintiffs are able to uncover hidden assets, the 
likelihood of receiving compensation increases if the nation or nations where the money is 
located extend comity to U.S. judgments.  But see infra Part II.C and accompanying notes 
for a discussion of the litigation arising from the Marcos regime in Philippines. 
 87. See infra Part II. 
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The data also suggest that conclusions drawn regarding hostility toward 
international law or the foreignness of lawsuits are, at least in part, 
misplaced.  Courts are actually more likely to rule for plaintiffs than 
defendants if the suit makes it to the merits.  Of course, this may illustrate 
the rigor to which cases of this nature are subject, but it also demonstrates 
that courts are not closing their doors entirely, as might be expected if the 
postulates advanced by litigation isolationists were true.  Awards have also 
increased over time, even while the percentage of default judgments has 
fallen, also suggesting that judges and juries are sympathetic to plaintiff 
claims and consider the level of injustice these cases present.  Further, the 
doctrines courts have predominantly used to dismiss ATS and TVPA suits 
differ from those that certain prominent scholars believe are used to shunt 
transnational cases.88  Almost no cases are dismissed on “abstention 
doctrines,” such as comity or forum non conveniens, that such scholars 
argue are based on adherence to the principle that courts should not 
intervene in international affairs.89  The dismissal doctrines actually used 
oscillate in relative importance based on the time period, but the two used 
primarily throughout are failure to state a claim under the law of nations 
and sovereign immunity—with the exception of the post-Kiobel II period 
dominated by considerations of the presumption against extraterritoriality.90  
These two doctrines do not reject international law because they only limit 
the type of transnational suits that can be brought in U.S. courts based on 
their severity and the type of actor involved, rather than rejecting these suits 
wholesale. 
This part is broken down into aspects that reveal the overall “success” of 
ATS and TVPA suits and courts’ attitudes to these suits writ large. 
A.  Dismissal Rates 
The most striking observation over the past thirty-five years is the high 
overall dismissal rate of ATS and TVPA cases.  In total, approximately 325 
nonfrivolous, non pro se cases91 that rely on one or both statutes for their 
	
 88. See infra Part II.D. 
 89. See infra Table 1. 
 90. See infra Table 1. 
 91. Approximately 110 additional pro se cases were filed, mostly on the basis that the 
plaintiff-prisoners were mistreated in violation of the Vienna Convention, for example by 
not being advised of their Miranda rights in English, De Los Santos Mora v. Brady, No. 06-
Civ-46, 2007 WL 981605, at *1–2 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2007) (dismissing a citizen of the 
Dominican Republic’s complaint alleging that the officer advised him and another passenger 
in the car of their Miranda rights, but as a Spanish speaker, he did not understand them), or 
by being denied the opportunity to consult with their consulates after being arrested, 
Keszthelyi v. Bowman, No. 1:06-Civ-187, 2007 WL 626221, at *3–4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 
2007) (dismissing a South African national’s claim based on the alleged failure to advise 
him, after arresting him, of his right (under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention) to contact 
the South African consulate). 
  This number also excludes cases in which the plaintiff or plaintiffs is or are not 
aliens, cases that Professor Stephens included when she tabulated how many ATS cases had 
been resolved between 1980 and 1997. See Stephens, supra note 13, at 1447, 1448 & n.117. 
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causes of action were resolved from 1980 to 2015,92 with twenty-seven 
suits still pending.93  Out of the approximately 325 cases that were 
resolved, approximately 220 were dismissed at the pleading stage94 (around 
68 percent), with only thirty-one of these approximately 220 (around 14 
percent) dismissed without prejudice.  This is a shocking inversion of the 
role played by motions to dismiss in most cases even after Bell Atlantic 
Corporation v. Twombly95 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal96 (together, “Twiqbal”), 
which, at least according to some studies, increased dismissal rates at the 
pleading stage.97  Indeed, post-Twiqbal motions to dismiss are only filed in 
approximately 6 percent of all federal civil cases.98  In § 1983 cases, which 
are often considered the least successful domestic civil rights cases and 
which often share many fact patterns with ATS and TVPA cases (e.g., 
physical abuse), motions to dismiss are filed approximately 12 percent of 
the time.99  Of the motions to dismiss in all cases as of 2010, 75 percent 
	
 92. These suits may include additional causes of action typically arising from the Anti-
Terrorism Act (ATA), Trafficking Victim Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), or domestic tort laws, and 
if plaintiffs prevail, the win may turn on these other causes of action.  Nevertheless, the ATS 
and TVPA are significant enough claims to merit separate discussion by the deciding court if 
these claims are dismissed or still pending when a settlement is reached. See, e.g., Javier H. 
v. Garcia-Botello, 239 F.R.D. 342 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting leave to amend RICO 
complaint by adding ATS claims).  The case partially settled on May 24, 2013, with ATS 
claims still pending. Javier H. v. Garcia-Botello, No. 1:02-cv-00523, slip op. at 1–4 
(W.D.N.Y. May 24, 2013). 
 93. See supra note 37 for the definition of “pending.”  Of the pending cases, nine have 
been dismissed and are awaiting the outcome of an appeal, a decision on an amended 
complaint, or an additional dispositive action. 
 94. This figure does not disaggregate 12(b)(6) motions from 12(b)(1) and 12(c) motions, 
but that is because courts themselves often do not do so in this context.  For example, if the 
defendant argues that the alleged acts do not amount to a violation of the law of nations, and 
a court finds such an argument persuasive, the court could either find that the complaint fails 
to state a claim because the facts alleged do not rise to a recognized violation of the law of 
nations (such as forced labor) or find that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the 
complaint because forced labor is not a violation of the law of nations.  In reaching the 
former conclusion, a court would generally assume for the sake of argument that forced 
labor could violate the law of nations but did not under these specific factual conditions, 
effectively blurring the distinction among the three motions. 
 95. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 96. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 97. Compare JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL:  REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/17889/download 
(conducting an empirical study using the CM/ECF filing system to show that new pleading 
standards do not affect dismissal rates) [http://perma.cc/234L-MJDY], with Engstrom, supra 
note 34, at 1234 (estimating an overall Twiqbal effect of approximately 11 percent).  
Importantly, Professor Engstrom notes that post-Twiqbal, parties to lawsuits themselves have 
demonstrated a selection bias that accounts for much of the effect.  Engstrom, supra note 34, 
at 1219 n.54, 1223 n.66.  That is to say, post-Twiqbal not only did some greater percentage 
of courts dismiss claims, but also plaintiffs may have filed fewer or different claims, 
defendants may have filed more motions to dismiss, and settlement dynamics may have 
changed. Id. at 1223–24. 
 98. CECIL ET AL., supra note 97, at 8. 
 99. Id. at 8–9. 
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were granted in whole or in part.100  But of these 75 percent, 35 percent 
were granted with leave to amend.101  In civil rights cases, 78 percent of 
motions to dismiss were fully or partially granted, but 33 percent of these 
dismissals included leave to amend.102  As such, not only do ATS and 
TVPA suits have a likelihood of dismissal that is an order of magnitude 
higher than these cases, but courts also frequently conclude that plaintiffs 
could not allege additional facts that would change the outcome and 
therefore dismiss with prejudice.103 
As shown in Figure 1, the volume of resolved cases increased 
dramatically over time, with the exception of the 1992 to 1995 and 2013 to 





 100. Id. at 13. 
 101. Id. at 14. 
 102. Id. at 8. 
 103. That such motions were so easily granted in ATS and TVPA cases of course has 
huge ramifications not only for the possibility of obtaining relief for the plaintiffs, but also 
for exposing the wrongs perpetrated through discovery.  While limited jurisdictional 
discovery is granted in some cases, this is a rarity.  As such, the symbolism and “soft” 
success of these cases are also called into question. 
 33  
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 60  
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Nevertheless, despite the increase in caseloads from 2004 to 2013, the 
dismissal rate remained within a 15 percent range for all periods.104  
Dismissals slightly increased over time, with the exception of the 1980 to 
1992 period.105  Many cases have been dismissed post-Kiobel II—indeed, 
more than in the 1995 to 2004 period in absolute terms.  Yet, the dismissal 
rate for the most recent post-Kiobel II period is actually on par with other 




 104. See infra Figure 2. 
 105. One prominent scholar has suggested that corporate lawsuits are weaker if brought 
by private sector lawyers who possess less familiarity with the statute and make weaker 
factual allegations and that the entrance of major law firms as defense counsel in the wake of 
corporate lawsuits resulted in doctrinal changes that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
prevail. See Email from Beth Van Schaack, Visiting Professor in Human Rights 2014–2015, 
Stanford Law Sch., Professor of Law, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Mar. 31 
2015, 16:35 PST) (on file with the author).  This Article does not examine such factors in 
depth, which would require tabulation of the types of organizations representing the 
plaintiffs.  It does, however, examine the success rate of corporate lawsuits and the evolution 
of dismissal grounds over time, which may partially shed light on this postulate. 
 79% 
 64%  62% 
 67% 
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Note:  All cases classified as split motions to dismiss with and without prejudice are counted 
as with prejudice.   
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The high dismissal rate does support the proposition that transnational 
human rights suits have modest economic outcomes as the vast majority of 
them result in no payout whatsoever.  Of course, it would be difficult if not 
impossible to account for all variables that explain why courts have 
dismissed suits at these rates over the past thirty-five years.  This exercise is 
particularly difficult without going into the precise nature of the claims 
brought, including not simply the causes of action alleged, but also the 
factual allegations made in support of them.  Nevertheless, the postulate 
that courts are increasingly hostile toward these claims because of their 
foreignness seems unlikely given the relative stability in this dismissal 
rate.106  Or else, if courts have become increasingly hostile toward these 
cases, plaintiffs have been able to circumvent this increased hostility 
through the types of claims they bring, the manner in which they couch 
these claims, and the manner in which they respond to defenses—the three 
factors most likely to be relevant at the pleading stage.  Indeed, as Part III 
shows, the types of claims alleged varied as the periods evolved, with 
higher dismissal rates for harms of a lesser magnitude than torture, 
genocide, and extrajudicial killings—some core claims that remained 
actionable throughout. 
B.  Settlement 
A single-digit percentage of ATS and TVPA cases settle, yet the few 
settlements reached are often in the tens of millions of dollars, as illustrated 
by Figure 3.  This suggests that the transnational human-rights enterprise is 
indeed modest, but perhaps only mostly so.  Out of the 325 cases brought 
by ATS and TVPA plaintiffs, only twenty-three (approximately 7 percent) 
had settled as of this Article’s publication.107  It is hard to tell how large 
many of these settlements are, because they are, for the most part, 
confidential.  Nevertheless, known settlements generally eclipse those in the 
domestic civil rights arena with the possible exception of class action 
employment discrimination lawsuits.108  The largest known corporate 
settlement under the ATS was over Swiss banks that secretly retained the 
deposits of Jewish customers killed during the Holocaust.109  The case 
	
 106. Of course, this combination likely rules out docket clogging as well.  That courts are 
not dismissing these cases at a higher rate at an earlier stage, even when the claims spiked 
and when the complexity of these cases was at its peak, suggests courts are not merely 
throwing out these cases because they take up more space. 
 107. For purposes of this Article, if a case settled after a motion to dismiss with leave to 
amend, it was not counted as a dismissal but rather as a settlement.  As such, the dataset does 
not reflect the lifecycle of a case with perfect verisimilitude.  For counting purposes, this 
Article excludes certain settlements, though they are included in the dataset. See infra notes 
110, 113.  This Article also excludes probable or possible settlements where, for example, 
the parties voluntarily dismissed claims after a favorable ruling for the plaintiff(s). 
 108. See Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 
49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 368–69 (2008) (collecting cases from the 1990s and 2000s resulting in 
payouts ranging from $54 to $190 million against major corporate defendants for 
employment discrimination). 
 109. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141–42 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
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settled in 1998 for a record-breaking $1.25 billion and “was followed by 
actions by World War II slave laborers, which were settled for more than $5 
billion” and “additional claims arising out of the Holocaust and other World 
War II atrocities, the Armenian genocide, and U.S. slavery, among 
others.”110  The largest civil rights settlement in U.S. history for the 
Department of Agriculture’s alleged systematic racial discrimination in 
awarding financial assistance after the promise of “an acre and a mule” was 
initially valued at approximately $2.25 billion, but only $1 billion was ever 
collected.111  The case, which dates from the Clinton Administration, has 
inspired follow-up litigation that in turn settled for $1.1 billion.112  Of 
course, the Holocaust and slavery reparations suits are outliers in the ATS 
and civil rights arenas, respectively.  Nevertheless, other ATS settlements 
still managed to clock in around the tens of millions mark.  For example, 
the next largest agreement after the Holocaust litigation,113 Doe I. v. Unocal 
Corp.,114 allegedly settled for $30 million.115  The lowest settlement 
	
 110. Id.; STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 13, at 543.  There are good reasons to discount 
these settlements, as Professor Goldhaber does, Goldhaber, supra note 11, at 129 n.12, given 
the diplomatic pressure exerted by the U.S. government to obtain them, see, e.g., In re 
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 142, the fact that some, at least, were 
settled pursuant to bilateral treaties (not the ATS or TVPA), and the fact that many were 
based on causes of action generally not recognized under the ATS, such as expropriation of 
property, see, e.g., Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(describing a suit for the expropriation of assets by descendants of Jewish customers of 
French banks); Cases and Representative Matters, CARLIN LAW OFFICES, http://www.carlin 
lawoffices.com/cases.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (explaining that the case settled for 
$300 million) [http://perma.cc/S4YL-UK9X].  For the purposes of this Article, I similarly do 
not include them. 
 111. Kelly Toledano, Making Good on Broken Promises:  How the Pigford Settlement 
Has Given African-American Farmers a Second Chance, 5 S. REGION BLACK L. STUDENTS 
ASS’N L.J. 68, 80–81 (2011). 
 112. Kindaka Jamal Sanders, Re-Assembling Osiris:  Rule 23, the Black Farmers Case, 
and Reparations, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 339, 341 (2013) (describing the Claims Resolution 
Act of 2010 that created a $1.1 billion fund to finance the In re Black Farmers 
Discrimination Litigation settlement). 
 113. For counting purposes, this Article excludes the $75 million settlement reached after 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the 
Nigerian plaintiffs’ allegations against Pfizer that the drug company tested a drug for 
meningitis without their informed consent because the settlement was premised on a 
concomitant suit brought by the government of Nigeria and the state of Kano against Pfizer 
in Nigerian courts. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01-Civ-8118, 2005 WL 1870811, at *188 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (dismissing case for multiple reasons, including that testing without 
informed consent did not violate the law of nations), rev’d and remanded, 562 F.3d 163, 187 
(2d Cir. 2009) (holding that medical experimentation under these circumstances violated the 
law of nations and instructing the district court to evaluate forum non conveniens factors). 
See also Pfizer Lawsuit (re Nigeria), BUS. & HUMAN RTS. RESOURCE CTR., http://business-
humanrights.org/en/pfizer-lawsuit-re-nigeria#c9346 (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http:// 
perma.cc/JG5D-T8F7]. 
 114. 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per stipulation en banc, 403 F.3d 
708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 115. Goldhaber, supra note 11, at 129. 
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involved an Iraqi security contractor, which provided $100,000 per 
deceased plaintiff and $20,000 to $30,000 per injured plaintiff.116 
The settlement rates and amounts varied significantly.  The greatest 
absolute number of settlements occurred in the 2004 to 2013 period, with 
twelve cases settling.  The absolute payouts of these settlements (excluding 




The fact that these settlements occurred seems to be proof that courts are 
not hostile against corporate claims.  Courts universally denied 
corporations’ motions to dismiss in cases prior to these settlements, 
assuming—and in some case explicitly deciding—that corporations could 
be held liable under international law.117 
C.  Trials and Default Judgments 
Interestingly, although the odds are against a plaintiff at the pleading 
stage, if he or she survives a motion to dismiss, he or she has a decent 
chance of winning on the merits, again suggesting the suits are potentially 
	
 116. In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009) (dismissing a 
complaint against businesses and an owner for killing or seriously injuring Iraqi citizens 
while providing security to U.S. nationals; this case was settled privately). 
 117. Only one decision ever indicated otherwise, and it was not premised on hostility 
toward international law, but rather on a conservative interpretation of it.  See Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other 
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); see also infra Part III.D.  Prior to Kiobel I, the Second 
Circuit itself assumed corporations could be liable in nine different cases. See In re S. 
African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254 n.125 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (collecting cases). 
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less modest than advertised.118  Out of the 325 cases resolved, fifty-six (17 
percent) made it to the merits.119  In these cases, plaintiffs prevailed 
approximately 63 percent of the time.  And often when the defendants 
prevailed—for example, when default judgments were denied sua sponte—
these rulings were based on technical grounds, like sovereign immunity, 
rather than whether the defendant had actually committed the violations.  
This contrasts with the figures from civil rights cases, in which plaintiffs 
lose because insufficient evidence supports their claims. 
There are too few trials to meaningfully assess success rates over time.  
Interestingly, however, the number of default judgments is higher than the 
number of trials, and therefore some observations can be made.  (The 
percentage—though not the absolute number—of default judgments 




It is possible that this trend evinces judicial hostility toward human rights 
claims in U.S. courts, as at least some courts examined on their own 
initiative whether such cases should be dismissed without an appearance 
from the defendant.  More likely, though, the trend results from the fact that 
cases were increasingly brought against corporations, which are far more 
	
 118. Only seven were decided at the summary judgment stage.  Other cases were decided 
at a variety of different stages such as a voluntary dismissal.  Because there are many cases 
with miscellaneous procedural postures, this Article does not detail them all, although the 
dataset does. 
 119. For purposes of this Article, cases that make it to the merits involved a trial or 
default judgment, either granted or denied or some other equivalent determination.  This 
excludes cases decided on summary judgment, cases that settled, cases that were voluntarily 
dismissed after surviving a motion to dismiss, and other equivalent determinations. 
 120. See infra Figure 4. 
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likely to appear than individual defendants located outside of the United 
States.  Indeed, of the approximately 325 cases, at least 127 (38 percent) 
had a corporate defendant, and no case between Filártiga and Kadic had 
corporate defendants.121  Of the three judgments against corporations—of 
which two were default judgments and the third a jury trial122—one was 
reversed on appeal,123 and in another the plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew 
after the defendant later appeared to challenge enforcement.124  As such, the 
decrease in default judgments—which includes the 1995 to 2004 period 
when the doctrinal conditions were arguably the most favorable for these 
cases—is probably due to the defendants actually appearing.125  And of the 
two nonfrivolous default judgments that were denied, one was based on 
doctrines that, as explained in Part II.D, do not reflect a belief that the case 
lacks a sufficient nexus to the United States or litigation isolationism.126 
Nevertheless, despite the percentage decrease in awards that suggests 
these suits are not as successful as they used to be, the number of cases in 




 121. Some cases had corporate plaintiffs. See infra Part III. 
 122. See Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, No. 1:08-cv-01659, slip op. at 1–2 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2009) (reporting trial verdict awarded to torture victim detained by 
Bangladeshi police at the behest of his employer after he refused to turn over his stake in the 
company); Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., No. 1:06-cv-22128, slip op. at 1–2 (S.D. Fla. 
Nov. 7, 2013) (awarding judgment of $80 million against the defendant, a shipping company 
involved in human trafficking with the government of Cuba); Aguilar v. Imperial Nurseries, 
No. 3:07-Civ-193, 2008 WL 2572250, at *1–2 (D. Conn. May 28, 2008) (granting default 
judgment in an H-2 visa human trafficking case). 
 123. Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, 746 F.3d 42, 54–55 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(overturning jury verdict). 
 124. Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., No. 1:06-cv-22128, slip op. at 1–2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 
17, 2015) (granting voluntary dismissal). 
 125. Many individual defendants are located outside of the United States.  In contrast, 
most corporations have an office in the United States to receive service of process. 
 126. See Chen v. China Cent. Television, 320 Fed. App’x 71 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing 
sua sponte a claim against a Chinese television station because the station was an 
instrumentality of the state under the FSIA); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1306 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004) (dismissing a claim on a motion of United States against local Chinese officials 
for abusing Falun Gong practitioners on the basis that the suit violated the act of state 
doctrine). But see Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 185, 
205 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing action based on border attacks between Israel and Lebanon, 
alleging that banks and others were involved in transfers of funds from the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to the terrorist group that carried out the attacks based on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality). 
 127. See supra Figures 3, 4; infra Figures 5, 6. 





The judgments, like the settlements, dwarf judgments in domestic areas 
of law, including civil rights and intentional torts.  Ultimately, almost none 
of these judgments have been collected because the defendants fled the 
country after they were sued, did not possess assets in the United States, or 
failed to appear.128  Nevertheless, most judgments are in the hundreds or 
	
 128. But see supra note 86. 
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tens of millions of dollars, with a handful in the billions, as illustrated by 
Figure 6.  For example, when the former dictator of the Philippines and his 
daughter were sued for the massacre of ten thousand citizens, the court 
awarded $1.2 billion in punitive damages and $766 million in compensatory 
damages.129  As of the date of this Article, the plaintiffs were still 
attempting to collect the judgment after a court in the Philippines ruled that 
the money belonged to its government.130  Similarly, in a case against the 
head of a nonstate organization responsible for the genocide in Rwanda, a 
district court awarded two groups of plaintiffs large sums of money:  $745 
million and $4.5 billion, respectively.131  None of the money was ever 
collected.132 
D.  Dismissal Grounds 
The grounds on which ATS and TVPA cases have been dismissed are not 
those predicted by some ATS commentators and do not reflect a hostility 
toward or an unwillingness to engage international law qua international 
law—at least pre-Kiobel II.133  Rather, they suggest that courts have a 
relatively conservative interpretation of what international law norms mean 
and whether they apply to a given fact pattern. 
Scholars such as Pamela Bookman discuss so-called transnational 
avoidance doctrines that enable courts to shunt cases on domestic law civil 
procedure doctrines before ever reaching questions of international law or 
foreign relations, which is properly the domain of the executive.134  
Bookman takes courts “at their word” in determining judicial attitudes 
toward transnational suits, coining the phrase “litigation isolationism” to 
explain that U.S. courts are reluctant to take on suits that she argues have 
very little to do with the United States.135  Among other examples of 
	
 129. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 130. Vince Alvic & Alexis F. Nonato, Victims of Human Rights Violations Under 
Marcoses Ask Makati Court to Comply with Hawaii Judgment, BUS. WORLD, July 2, 2015, at 
S1. 
 131. Kadic v. Karadžić, No. 93-cv-1163 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2000) (awarding $745 
million to women who were raped during the Bosnian War); Doe I v. Karadžić, No. 93-cv-
878 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000) (awarding $4.5 billion to victims of rape, torture, and 
genocide during the Bosnian War). 
 132. Rachel Irwin, Civil Actions Offer Some Closure for Bosnia Victims, INST. FOR WAR 
& PEACE REPORTING (Apr. 26, 2011), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/civil-actions-offer-some-
closure-bosnia-victims [http://perma.cc/4FYV-A348]. 
 133. In part this may simply be due to the qualitative nature of the existing scholarship.  
Scholarly intuitions—including some of my own—are disproven by the data, which show a 
more nuanced landscape of dismissal doctrines. See supra note 23 (collecting scholarship). 
 134. See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 2, at 1084 & n.17, 1085 (collecting sources); see also 
supra note 23 (collecting scholarship). 
 135. Bookman, supra note 2, at 1085, 1089.  Although Bookman’s piece is about 
transnational suits generally, transnational human rights and claims feature “perhaps most 
controversially” in her article. Id. at 1084.  Bookman also makes no attempt to quantify how 
many cases she claims belong to each category within the broad umbrella of transnational 
suits.  She lists, for example, suits against “U.S. manufacturers alleging that their airplanes 
crashed overseas due to propellers malfunctioning[,] . . . [suits] alleging that foreign-owned 
companies plotted securities fraud in the United States[,] . . . [and suits] alleging that foreign 
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transnational human rights litigation dismissed on the grounds of being “too 
foreign,” Bookman highlights a now-notorious ATS suit brought against 
Chevron (formerly Texaco) for dumping eighteen billion gallons of toxic 
waste into the Amazon Rainforest.136  The case was dismissed to Ecuador 
by Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York because it had 
“everything to do with Ecuador and nothing to do with the United 
States.”137  Bookman identifies the most important transnational avoidance 
doctrines she believes are used to eliminate cases like these as personal 
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, extraterritoriality, and “abstention 
comity.”138  She also lists “the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, . . . forum selection clauses, comity, and the political 
question,” as well as “the act of state doctrine, standing, and the limited 
enforcement of treaties that are not self-executing” doctrines.139  Professor 
Stephens takes a similar tack.  Although in an earlier piece she 
acknowledges that immunity doctrines and failure to state a claim under the 
law of nations led to many dismissals,140 in her seminal treatise, she isolates 
“political question, act of state, comity, ‘case-specific’ deference to the U.S. 
executive branch, and the foreign affairs doctrine” as some of the most 
important dismissal grounds.141  At core, these latter doctrines are not 
merely instrumental means of terminating suits; they reflect judicial 
attitudes toward the ATS, and debates over the ATS “offer a unique 
window into the modern history of international law.”142 
But the above doctrines are not, in fact, the primary means for dismissing 
transnational human rights suits—at least not pre-Kiobel II.  As can be seen 
	
firms exported dangerous products to the United States that caused injury there” as other 
categories. Id.  Given the hundreds of cases in the ATS and TVPA category, it is safe to 
assume they represent a large quantity of these cases. 
 136. Bookman, supra note 2, at 1100. 
 137. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 
303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).  I have engaged in advocacy work with the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs in this case.  Any views expressed are my own.  For a more thorough discussion of 
the suit, see Kenney, supra note 4. 
 138. Bookman, supra note 2, at 1096 (quoting Maxwell Commc’ns Corp. v. Societe 
Generale, 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also id. at 1096 & n.94 (collecting cases). 
 139. Bookman, supra note 2, at 1084 n.17 (citations omitted). 
 140. Stephens, supra note 28, at 777. 
 141. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 13, at 337.  Stephens unequivocally states that 
immunity doctrines were featured heavily in recent years and that these reflect a 
conservative interpretation of international law. Stephens, supra note 13, at 1524.  
Nevertheless, Professor Stephens contends that these doctrines were not a principle means of 
dismissing ATS and TVPA suits before the George W. Bush Administration “because courts 
had little difficulty holding that the acts at issue . . . were not official acts and, therefore, that 
government officials were not entitled to immunity”—a statement that underestimates the 
importance of the immunity doctrines prior to the arrival of President George W. Bush. Id.  
Stephens’s position on the political question doctrine is also somewhat muddy.  On the one 
hand, she explicitly lists it in her treatise as one of the arguments proffered in favor of 
dismissing transnational suits on the basis that foreign policy is the province of the 
executive. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 13, at 337.  On the other hand, she states that courts 
have almost universally rejected the political question doctrine as a means of dismissing 
ATS suits. Id. at 338–39. 
 142. Stephens, supra note 13, at 1467–70. 
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in Table 1, the most commonly used methods of dismissing ATS cases are 
failure to state a claim under the law of nations and immunity doctrines, in 
particular sovereign immunity.143  As Part III discusses in greater detail, in 
dismissing a case for failure to state a claim under the law of nations, courts 
actively engage international law.144  They grapple with what types of 
harms are protected under the principle of customary international law—
where norms against the behavior in question are so strong as to create an 
international consensus that they are illegal—and whether the harms as 
alleged are severe enough to violate these norms.  And, as Part III discusses 
in detail, immunity doctrines also are components of international law that 
reflect the principle that governments, sitting heads of state, and diplomats 
are sometimes exempt from civil jurisdiction in U.S. courts—and the 
domestic courts of most foreign countries—out of respect for reciprocity 
and communication in the international community.145  Without such 
protections, the thinking goes, the international community would be unable 
to freely function because each nation’s officials would constantly be sued 
by other countries for offenses they committed.146  Of course, there are 
exceptions to such doctrines under international law, such as jus cogens, 
which provides certain norms cannot be derogated under any 
circumstances,147 an argument that certain courts have adopted and that 
illustrates they do not uniformly engage in what Bookman labels 
“abstention comity.”148  Indeed, figuring out the precise boundaries of these 
immunities, and under what circumstances they attach, is the bread and 
butter of international law, and it requires courts to understand and engage 
international law principles, not shun them due to suits’ foreignness. 
The above doctrines remained the two most prevalent means of 
dismissing these cases and were used approximately 35 percent and 27 
percent of the time, respectively, over the entire time span analyzed.  They 
remained prominent even during periods scholars might not expect them to 
be.  For example, even after a 1989 Supreme Court decision held that the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act149 (FSIA) rendered sovereign states 
immune from suit unless the state met one of the statutorily codified 
	
 143. Professor Stephens also asserts that suits brought under the ATS by non-aliens 
represent a statistically significant number of cases dismissed. See id. at 1448 & n.117.  This 
dataset indicates that non-aliens only bring a fraction of cases.  A far more statistically 
significant ground that Professor Stephens does not note are cases brought by pro se litigants 
who do not allege facts that support the causes of action they advance.  Cases of this ilk—
marked as “IPC” and “PS” in the dataset—are far more predominant. 
 144. See, e.g., infra Part III. 
 145. See, e.g., infra Part III; see also Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State 
Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 818 
(2011). 
 146. Akande & Shah, supra note 145, at 818. 
 147. Jus Cogens, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 148. See infra Part III.D. 
 149. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (2012). 
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exceptions,150 courts continued to invoke the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity against states and their instrumentalities. 
As to the numerous doctrines Bookman and Professor Stephens invoke, 
combined they make up far fewer grounds of dismissal.  Pre-Kiobel II, they 
represented an even smaller amount of all dismissals.  Indeed, of all 220 
cases dismissed, only six were dismissed on the ground of forum non 
conveniens—seven if counting Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 
N.A.151 twice.  (After the courts of Guatemala refused to hear the case due 
to a “blocking statute,”152 the plaintiffs attempted to return it to the forum 
that dismissed it to no avail.153)  Similarly, only thirteen fully resolved 
cases were decided on the basis of raising a nonjudiciable political question, 
and most of these were decided on other grounds as well.154  As to personal 
jurisdiction, most of these twenty dismissals were based on inadequate 
service of process rather than lack of contacts to the forum that would 
indicate “isolationism” or a refusal to apply international law. 
	  
	
 150. See generally Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 
(1989). See, e.g., de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D.D.C. 1980) 
(“[A] foreign state is not entitled to immunity from an action seeking money damages ‘for 
personal injury or death . . . caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state’ or its 
officials or employees.”). 
  Note that this position does not reflect attempts to hold individuals liable as 
described in Part III.D. 
 151. 741 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2014); 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 152. See M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation:  How Convenient Is 
Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 21, 
27 (2007) (discussing “blocking statutes” employed by countries depriving their courts of 
jurisdiction to hear cases dismissed on a forum non conveniens basis from the United States 
or elsewhere). 
 153. Aldana, 741 F.3d at 1352. 
 154. A court in the Eastern District of Virginia recently dismissed an additional case on 
political question grounds, but that decision is being appealed. See infra note 367. 
1082 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Table 1:  Dismissal Grounds by Year 
 
 
Notes:   
(1)  Percent reflects all occurrences of grounds of dismissal per resolved case. 
(2)  Includes all immunity doctrines, including sovereign immunity, head-of-state immunity, diplomatic 
immunity, et cetera. 
	  








Law of Nations 12 46% 
Immunity Doctrines(2) 9 35% 
Nonjusticiable Political Question 3 12% 





5 Immunity Doctrines(2) 5 71% 
Law of Nations 2 29% 
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Table 1 continued 
 
 
Notes:   
(1)  Percent reflects all occurrences of grounds of dismissal per resolved case. 
(2)  Includes all immunity doctrines, including sovereign immunity, head-of-state immunity, diplomatic 
immunity, et cetera.  








Law of Nations 11 29% 
Immunity Doctrines(2) 7 18% 
Statute of Limitations 6 16% 
Personal Jurisdiction 3 8% 
No Private Right of Action 2 5% 
Nonjusticiable Political Question 2 5% 
Forum Non Coveniens 1 3% 






Law of Nations 41 37% 
Immunity Doctrines(2) 27 25% 
Personal Jurisdiction 11 10% 
Insufficiently Pled Complaint 8 7% 
Nonjusticiable Political Question 6 5% 
No Grounds Given 6 5% 
Not Natural Person 5 5% 
Other Grounds 28 25% 
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Table 1 continued 
 
 
Notes:   
(1)  Percent reflects all occurrences of grounds of dismissal per resolved case. 
(2)  Includes all immunity doctrines, including sovereign immunity, head-of-state immunity, diplomatic 
immunity, et cetera. 
 
Finally, for many years there was widespread handwringing over whether 
the ATS was purely jurisdictional such that it did not create a cause of 
action, and cases such as Tel-Oren reflected this trend.155  Some scholars, 
especially Professors Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, argued that 
the ATS could not support suits for violations of the law of nations because 
only the political branches can incorporate customary international law into 
domestic law.156  As Sosa established, the ATS is jurisdictional, but the 
cause of action is found in federal common law that incorporates customary 
international law.157  And no empirical evidence supports the proposition 
that any significant number of non pro se cases, pre-Sosa, were dismissed 
because the ATS does not confer a private right of action, though several 
cases were dismissed because they relied on non self-executing treaties as 
evidence of the law of nations.158  The only cases in the dataset falling into 
this category do so either because they rely on a non self-executing treaty 
	
 155. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 13, at 27. 
 156. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law As 
Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 833–34 
(1997). 
 157. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692, 719, 724 (2004). 
 158. Only one non pro se case in the dataset was dismissed on the basis that the ATS did 
not create a cause of action pre-Sosa, but even this case did not explicitly rely on the ATS as 
a cause of action. See White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1382, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998) 
(dismissing suit brought against prison physician, alleging in part that plaintiffs were 
subjected to nonconsensual medical experimentation while in custody in violation of 
international law’s prohibition of crimes against humanity). 









Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 16 38% 
 
Immunity Doctrines(2) 11 26% 
 
Law of Nations 6 14% 
 
Personal Jurisdiction 6 14% 
 
Other Grounds 20 48% 
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that was not well established enough to form a norm under customary 
international law or because plaintiffs attempted to invoke norms that were 
not sufficiently definite or universal. 
III.  FINDINGS AND TRENDS OVER EACH TIME PERIOD 
This part details the evolution of transnational human rights claims under 
the ATS and TVPA over time, summarizing the success rates and major 
doctrinal shifts over each period. 
The data support three major takeaways.  First, while the dismissal rate 
remained within the same 15 percent band, major doctrinal shifts occurred 
over time, such as the emergence of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and the doctrine that corporations are not persons under 
international law.  Second, the data illustrate not only that new dismissal 
grounds emerged, but also that shifts often occurred intra-doctrinally.  In 
other words, judicial interpretations of the law of nations, sovereign 
immunity, and other existing dismissal grounds evolved, though 
occasionally in contradictory directions.  Sometimes lower courts refused to 
follow the Supreme Court, and sometimes the Supreme Court actually 
proved helpful to plaintiffs when lower courts accepted new arguments 
against these cases.  For example, even as lower courts ratcheted up the 
immunity afforded government officials, the Supreme Court checked that 
tendency.  And even as the Supreme Court imposed the new territoriality 
requirement, at least some lower courts were quick to interpret it narrowly.  
Third, while the dismissal rates remained relatively constant, the data 
establish that plaintiffs increasingly diversified the identity of defendants, 
as suits moved from suits against individuals to suits against state 
instrumentalities to suits against private entities and corporations, which 
expanded the scope of ATS and TVPA liability. 
While it is impossible to prove causality based on the dataset, these facts 
suggest that attempts to expand ATS and TVPA liability were not entirely 
successful.  On the other hand, these facts suggest that plaintiffs’ lawyers 
were able to circumvent the evolution and doctrinal shifts that occurred 
during some of these periods, including both post-Sosa and post-Kiobel II, 
by bringing cases that stood up to these shifts, or through effective 
pleading, or both. 
A.  From Filártiga to the TVPA 
The early period of the ATS—largely considered the “honeymoon” phase 
by scholars159—was actually one in which plaintiffs experienced the lowest 
success rates.160  One potential explanation is that courts were hostile 
	
 159. Stephens, supra note 13, at 1469. 
 160. Until the passage of the TVPA in 1991, at least thirty-three nonfrivolous, non pro se 
ATS suits were fully resolved apart from Filártiga, and thirteen more were filed.  Of these 
cases, only four were resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.  Three cases have unknown end 
results, but the last recorded opinion in two of these indicates the ATS claims would likely 
have been dismissed.  The remaining twenty-six cases were dismissed before even reaching 
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toward international law.  Yet, the low success rate may be better explained 
by a judicial struggle to develop a workable definition of the law of nations, 
as well as a conservative interpretation of which actors could be sued.  In 
the few cases where plaintiffs did prevail, they alleged harms similar to 
those in Filártiga, namely torture and extrajudicial killings, and sued state 
officials, forming the hallmarks of actionable ATS and TVPA claims today. 
The biggest mark against the ATS and manifestation of hostility toward 
international law qua international law was Tel-Oren, which as noted was a 
suit against the PLO and other entities for the torture and death of many 
Israelis.161  The per curiam section gave no reason for the decision.162  
However, Judge Bork argued in his concurrence that the ATS did not itself 
create a cause of action for violations of the law of nations.163  He based 
this conclusion on the logic underlying the act of state doctrine164 and the 
political question doctrine (derived from the former in the context of 
international law).165 According to Judge Bork, while the act of state 
doctrine had originally been premised on “comity” and respect for the 
“sovereignty” of sister nations, it evolved into a separation of powers 
doctrine premised on a recognition that the judiciary has no institutional 
competence to intervene in foreign affairs, deemed within the province of 
the executive.166  Congress or the President could have affirmatively 
authorized a private cause of action in a treaty or other agreement for 
plaintiffs to pursue under the ATS but did not.167  To conclude otherwise 
would interfere with the executive’s design in enacting treaties or otherwise 
acceding to international law.168  Judge Robb based his concurrence 
entirely on the political question doctrine, arguing that there were no 
judicial standards through which to assess the case nor was it the 
prerogative of the courts to intervene in matters of foreign affairs in which 
neither Congress nor the executive provided guidance for statutory 
construction.169 
	
the summary judgment stage, meaning at minimum courts terminated approximately 79 
percent of all cases resolved during this period at the pleading stage.  This is the highest rate 
of any of the five periods with the exception of post-Kiobel II.  And during this time, the 
judgments favoring plaintiffs and the one settlement were relatively minor compared to what 
they would later amount to in dollar value.  The highest dollar value amounted to 
approximately $60 million, none of which was ever collected. 
 161. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 162. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
 163. Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 164. Id. at 789 (Edwards, J., concurring) (“Where the Act of State Doctrine applies, the 
Supreme Court has directed the courts not to inquire into the validity of the public acts of a 
recognized foreign sovereign committed within its own territory . . . .  The doctrine does not 
require courts to decline jurisdiction, as does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, but 
only not to reach the merits of certain issues.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 165. Id. at 800. 
 166. Id. at 802. 
 167. Id. at 814–19. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). 
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Although Tel-Oren prompted massive scholarly commentary, it was an 
island doctrinally speaking.  No other case during this time period struck 
down ATS claims on Judge Bork’s logic or, for that matter, Judge Robb’s, 
however compelling they may have been to scholars or officials in the 
Reagan Administration.  The real hostility toward ATS cases was likely a 
result of their novelty.  Judges and parties had rarely grappled with the 
statute before and, as such, knew very little about what to do with it.  
Historically it had only been applied to a narrow array of cases, for 
example, those related to ambassadors.170  After Filártiga, both individual 
victims of human rights abuses and corporations contended that defendants 
violated their rights under the law of nations.  Because many of these fact 
patterns, as well as the categories of the parties who brought them or were 
sued under them, differed in kind from Filártiga, courts were left without 
much guidance on a number of questions. 
Filártiga did not define what constituted the law of nations, except to say 
that it “may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing 
professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; 
or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.”171  In applying 
this methodology, courts adopted a narrow definition of the phrase, 
rejecting claims based on torts such as negligence,172 conversion,173 
expropriation of property,174 and fraud,175 even when the facts suggested 
potential human rights violations such as failure to protect from political 
violence or confiscation of property during a dictatorship.  Other claims that 
courts deemed not to violate the law of nations included abuses of free 
speech176 and environmental law treaties.177  At least one court ruled that 
	
 170. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts 
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 492–93, 492 n.143, 
494 n.152 (1986). 
 171. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v. 
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820)). 
 172. See, e.g., Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 343, 348 
(S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding plaintiff’s complaint that Sudan was negligent in failing to warn 
the plaintiff’s family of “imminent political danger and violence and failing to provide 
adequate police protection and security” did not state a claim under the law of nations and 
that the plaintiff failed to allege alien status). 
 173. See, e.g., Cohen v. Hartman, 634 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
Canadian citizen who alleged his employee converted his funds did not state a claim under 
the law of nations). 
 174. See, e.g., Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 
(dismissing Iranian nationals’ suit against the government of Iran to recover money for 
allegedly wrongful expropriation of their property on the grounds that Iran’s actions did not 
violate any U.S. treaty, and the law of nations does not prohibit a government’s 
expropriation of the property of its own nationals). 
 175. See, e.g., Trans-Continental Inv. Corp. v. Bank of Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp. 
565, 570 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that allegations by a foreign company against Michigan 
bank and its controlling persons for fraud was not a violation of the law of nations). 
 176. See, e.g., Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 278, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (holding 
that seizure of Philippine citizens’ film did not rise to the level of a violation of a universally 
recognized right, but also that the act of state doctrine immunized the government from suit). 
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while causing “disappearances” during a military dictatorship was a 
violation of the law of nations, “cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment” 
during the same was not, despite the corpus of treaty law surrounding the 
issue.178  And Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren found the allegations that the 
PLO tortured and killed Israelis similar to those of Filártiga and therefore 
theoretically actionable, but distinguished the case on the ground that 
nonstate entities could not be held liable for torture under international law, 
otherwise the crimes simply amounted to assault.179  Judge Edwards also 
argued that politically motivated terrorism, “no matter how repugnant it 
might be,” was not a violation of the law of nations given the lack of 
consensus in the international community condemning it.180 
There were many other cases where violations of the law of nations 
might have been established, and yet claims were still dismissed.  The 
second most important means of dismissing early ATS cases was sovereign 
immunity, a doctrine that was not deployed against officials themselves, but 
against states.  Nine cases were dismissed based on sovereign immunity, 
with three suits against the U.S. government181 and two more against its 
agents.182  The underlying rationale for these dismissals was that the United 
States cannot be sued unless it consents to such a suit and that the ATS does 
	
 177. See, e.g., Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(holding plaintiffs’ suit for shipment of contaminated copper did not rise to a violation of the 
law of nations because the defendant had violated no treaty). 
 178. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding claims for 
“cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment” did not amount to violations of the law of nations 
because the tort was not universally “definable,” i.e., it could encompass many different 
types of treatment).  This Article counts Forti as a “success” because the second amended 
complaint resulted in a default judgment for the plaintiff. Id.  Nevertheless, the opinion 
illustrates the narrow definition of the Law of Nations some courts crafted after Filártiga. 
 179. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.29 774, 791–95 (D.C. Cir. 1914) 
(Edwards, J., concurring). 
 180. Id. at 795–96. 
 181. Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. United States, 957 F.2d 886, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(dismissing suit by Panamanian businesses for looting in the wake of invasion of Panama); 
Lloyd’s Syndicate 609 v. United States, 917 F.2d 1552, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990) (dismissing 
suit arising out of many laws, including the ATS, for aircraft that was destroyed during 
fighting in Panama against the United States); Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 
F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dismissing suit under the ATS for refusal to permit a 
vessel to enter a port on the ground of risk to national security). 
 182. Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (dismissing suit by Haitian 
refugees detained after their entry for their unlawful detention and treatment received in a 
detention center); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 204–05 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(dismissing suit brought against the U.S. President and other federal defendants alleging they 
provided “financial, technical, and other support to anti-Nicaraguan terrorist groups” that 
“carried out scores of attacks on upon innocent” civilians that “resulted in summary 
execution, murder, abduction, torture, rape, wounding, and destruction of private property 
and public facilities” on the grounds of sovereign immunity as well as the political question 
doctrine (citation omitted)).  The last case, Bennett v. Stephens, No. 88-Civ-2610, 1989 WL 
17751 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1989), which dealt with a woman who believed the government was 
transmitting radio waves into her body, was nominally decided on the grounds of sovereign 
immunity even though it could well be deemed frivolous. Id. at *4. 
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not function as a waiver or as consent.183  Dismissal on this ground may 
have, in large part, been due less to the importance of the immunity 
accorded foreign countries than to a desire to protect our own government.  
Later periods suggest this reasoning may be motivating this doctrinal 
development because courts later held that U.S. officials could not be sued 
though foreign officials could be.  Of the cases against non-U.S. defendants, 
all three were brought against foreign governments (the Soviet Union,184 
Saudi Arabia,185 and Argentina186).  The Supreme Court effectively ended 
all litigation under the ATS against foreign states in Argentine Republic v. 
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.187  This decision held that jurisdiction over 
foreign states must be predicated solely on the FSIA—a statute passed in 
1976 that provides statutory immunity to foreign states unless one of the 
exceptions applies (e.g., for commercial activities or for state torts 
committed within the territory of the United States).188 
Other individual grounds of dismissal during this time period include 
individual cases dealing with inadequate service of process,189 the political 
question doctrine,190 and standing.191  For these latter two grounds, the 
	
 183. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, “[a] foreign state shall not be immune 
from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States . . . in which the foreign state has waived 
its immunity either explicitly or by implication.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2012); see also 
infra notes 188–91. 
 184. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 736 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1990) 
(holding that a guardian of a Swedish diplomat’s suit against Soviet Union for the diplomat’s 
unlawful seizure, subsequent imprisonment, and possible death was barred by sovereign 
immunity). 
 185. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, No. 88-Civ-1791, 1989 WL 435302, at *1, *4 (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 11, 1989) (dismissing suit brought by systems engineer against Saudi Arabia for being 
“shackled, tortured, and beaten” while he was detained by Saudi Arabia after making reports 
of safety violations), rev’d on other grounds, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1530 
(11th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), vacated on other grounds, 
996 F.2d 270 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 186. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431 (1989) 
(dismissing suit brought by Liberian corporation against Argentina for bombing its oil tanker 
on the high seas during the Falklands War). 
 187. 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
 188. Id. at 431; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).  Prior to Amerada Hess, one court had handed down 
a default judgment against the Republic of Chile for a car bombing during the military 
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet that killed both the Chilean ambassador and foreign 
minister to the United States while they were in Washington, D.C., en route to a meeting.  de 
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that such 
conduct constituted a violation of international law and that FSIA did not apply); Richard B. 
Lillich, Damages for Gross Violations of International Human Rights Awarded by U.S. 
Courts, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 207, 208 n.5 (1993) (reporting the damages were jointly assessed 
by the Chilean-U.S. Commission at $5,062,854.97). 
 189. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 115 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(dismissing British national’s suit against various businesses under the ATS for his 
imprisonment and torture in Saudi Arabia for inadequate service of process as to all but one, 
and holding that there was no evidence to substantiate the remaining defendants’ 
involvement). 
 190. See, e.g., Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332, 
1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that suit injunction against the deployment of cruise missiles 
in a town in England where a U.S. Air Force base was located raised a nonjusticiable 
political question). But see Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1512 (D.C. 
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courts expressed discomfort interfering with foreign policy decisions made 
by the coordinate branches of government—such as the decision to invade a 
foreign country or to act in the interests of national security—rather than 
with the executive’s desire not to deem the judiciary of a sister sovereign 
corrupt or otherwise unable to dispense justice.  That is to say, these 
doctrines have mostly come into play when the United States is a defendant 
rather than amicus or an intervenor (e.g., if the State Department submits a 
letter requesting or objecting to dismissal).192  As such, these doctrines 
arguably are not hostile toward international law or the foreignness of such 
lawsuits.  Another ground was the heads of state doctrine, which provides 
that current foreign heads of state cannot be liable for actions taken in their 
official capacity.193 
Plaintiffs prevailed in the four remaining cases, which alleged harms that 
went far beyond commercial torts and resembled the fact pattern in 
Filártiga—gruesome torture and extrajudicial killing.  Three of these suits 
were filed against the same foreign officer who acted under color of state 
law during Argentina’s Dirty War.194  This trilogy was important because it 
established new means for defendants to be held liable for actions they did 
not personally commit on the basis of “command responsibility” and helped 
establish that the head-of-state immunity doctrine did not apply to former 
members of government.  Over $89 million was collectively awarded in 
these cases, of which only $1000 was ever dispersed.195 
B.  From the TVPA to Kadic 
Perhaps this period should more rightly be deemed the “honeymoon” of 
the ATS and the TVPA.  From the passage of the TVPA on March 12, 
1992, until Kadic v. Karadžić on October 13, 1995, outcomes for plaintiffs 
were far more favorable—at least in terms of judgments and nondispositive 
opinions that paved the way for future large recoveries.  Plaintiffs prevailed 
	
Cir. 1984) (holding that suit against U.S. occupation of Honduran farmers’ land did not raise 
a political question). 
 191. De Arellano v. Weinberger, 788 F.2d 762, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that 
Honduran farmers whose land was illegally occupied by a U.S. military training center had 
cause of action under the ATS, but that because the occupation was in practical terms over, 
there was no standing to issue an injunction). 
 192. See Stephens, supra note 28, at 793 & n.109 (discussing the Department of State’s 
letter in a case involving Exxon and the Indonesian military). 
 193. See Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (discussing the act of 
state doctrine). 
 194. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 708–09 (N.D. Cal. 1988), No. 87-cv-2058 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1990) (awarding $8,000,000); Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason, No. C-
87-2057 SC, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19470, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 1988) (default 
judgment for $21,170,699).  Although no record exists of the subsequent proceedings in 
Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg Law or for the last case, a source reports that default 
judgments were awarded. See Lillich, supra note 188, at 207 n.4 (citing Quiros de Rapaport 
v. Suárez-Mason, No. 87-cv-2266 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1989) (awarding $60,004,852)).  The 
defendant was also extradited to Argentina to face criminal charges. In re Extradition of 
Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
 195. Sandra Coliver, Bringing Human Rights Abusers to Justice in U.S. Courts:  Carrying 
Forward the Legacy of the Nuremberg Trials, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1697 (2006). 
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approximately 36 percent of the time out of the eleven cases that were fully 
resolved during this period, winning three default judgments196 and 
hammering out one large settlement.197  Unfortunately, none of the 
judgments, which amounted to $81.5 million collectively, was ever 
collected.198 
These victories rejected several strands of jurisprudence hostile toward 
the application of international law, even, for example, the argument 
eventually accepted by Kiobel II that the ATS did not apply 
extraterritorially, as well as Judge Bork’s argument that the ATS did not 
confer a private right of action.  The cases pushed back against the new 
argument that defendants were protected by the act of state doctrine if their 
acts were official.  The victories also crystallized new actionable human 
rights violations committed by officials—whether committed in the course 
of their duties or not.  Despite victories, the majority of judgments during 
this time period were resolved in favor of defendants on the basis of 
sovereign immunity, for the most part not due to any doctrinal 
developments but rather to a time lag after Amerada Hess. 
First, two victories for plaintiffs upheld a new basis for liability beyond 
torture and extrajudicial killing:  cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  
The plaintiffs in a consolidated case brought under the ATS and TVPA, 
Xuncax v. Gramajo,199 alleged that the former Defense Minister of 
Guatemala, Hector Gramajo, forced them to flee Guatemala after the 
military “ransacked their villages” and murdered, tortured, and falsely 
imprisoned them or their family members.200  In the most egregious 
example, one of the plaintiffs was forced to watch as soldiers mutilated his 
father’s chest, back, and arms; shot him in the legs; and threw him into a 
hole filled with “burning mattresses and cardboard.”201  He saw his father’s 
burnt body, and when he returned home, his house was incinerated “and his 
	
 196. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Mass. 1995) (case against 
Guatemalan Minister of Defense); Todd v. Panjaitan, No. 92-Civ-12255, 1994 WL 827111, 
at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 1994) (case against Indonesian general awarding $14 million to 
plaintiff and also upholding liability on theory of command responsibility in the civil 
context); Paul v. Avril (Paul I), 812 F. Supp. 207, 209 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (case against the 
former head of the Haitian military). 
 197. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1992) (case against 
Argentina for kidnapping, torture, arbitrary detention, and forcible exile where sovereign 
immunity was waived by Argentina’s actions in related proceedings; the case settled for $6 
million). 
 198. Todd, No. 92-cv-12255 (D. Mass Nov. 14, 1994) (docket entry noting failed service 
of judgment); Email from Bob Corbett to Haiti Mailing List (May 30, 2001, 02:49 CDT), 
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti-archive/msg07862.html [hereinafter Corbett Email] 
(explaining the Paul judgment had, to date, not been enforced, but speculating that two 
plaintiffs received private payments) [http://perma.cc/EQS4-CRD7]; see infra note 204. 
 199.  886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (consolidating Nos. 91-cv-11564 and 91-cv-
11612). 
 200. Id. at 169–79.  The plaintiffs also sued under Guatemalan, state, and municipal tort 
law, and damages were considered on these bases as well. Id. at 200–02. 
 201. Id. at 170. 
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mother and sibling [were] gone.”202  The court held that certain allegations 
(such as forcing plaintiffs to witness the torture of family members) 
supported a claim of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.203  The court 
awarded the plaintiffs $45.5 million, though the money was never 
collected.204 
The second case, Paul v. Avril,205 involved a cause of action for cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment and was brought by six prominent 
opposition leaders to the Haitian dictatorship.  Among other things, they 
“ha[d] lit cigarettes inserted in[to] the[ir] nostrils, [were] put in 
contortionistic positions while beaten with particular attention being paid to 
the skull and groin . . . [were] deliberate[ly] starv[ed],” and were “paraded 
on national television and falsely accused of being involved in an 
assassination plot.”206  They sued Prosper Avril, the former head of the 
Haitian military, for torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, and other 
crimes.207  The court awarded a judgment of $41 million to the six 
plaintiffs.208  None of the money was collected.209 
The victories also rejected some of the arguments proffered against the 
application of international law.  In Paul, the defendant argued that there 
was no subject matter jurisdiction over suits between foreign plaintiffs 
against foreign defendants for acts arising outside of the United States; that 
following Judge Bork’s opinion in Tel-Oren, the ATS did not give rise to a 
cause of action; and, finally, that the act of state and political question 
doctrines barred the suit.210  The court rejected each of these arguments in 
turn.  It held that the text of the ATS, as well as surrounding precedent, 
made the statute applicable to “foreign cubed” cases—namely, cases 
brought by aliens against other aliens for conduct occurring abroad.211  It 
held that Judge Edward’s concurrence in Tel-Oren, which agreed with 
Filártiga, was the correct interpretation of the cause of action question.212  
And it finally held that the acts at issue did not qualify as “official public 
acts,” but instead as acts taken purely under “color of law”—and therefore 
	
 202. Id.  In the second action, a missionary was “kidnapped, tortured[,] and subjected to 
sexual abuse in Guatemala by personnel under Gramajo’s command.” Id. at 173.  She sued 
under the TVPA. Id. at 176. 
 203. Id. at 185–89.  One of the plaintiffs claimed “constructive expulsion” from 
Guatemala. See id. at 189.  The court ruled this did not constitute a violation of the law of 
nations. Id. 
 204. Id. at 198–99 (calculating damages under the ATS and TVPA).  The court awarded 
an additional $2 million in damages under Kentucky law. Id.  Gramajo refused to pay. 
Xuncax v. Gramajo and Ortiz v. Gramajo, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Oct. 9, 2007), http://ccr 
justice.org/ourcases/past-cases/xuncax-v.-gramajo-and-ortiz-v.-gramajo [http://perma.cc/ 
93VD-K7JG]. 
 205. 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
 206. Id. at 209. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Paul v. Avril (Paul II), 901 F. Supp. 330, 336 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (awarding damages 
after the defendant failed to appear). 
 209. See Corbett Email, supra note 198. 
 210. Paul I, 812 F. Supp. at 209. 
 211. Id. at 211–12. 
 212. Id. at 210–19. 
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the last two doctrines did not apply.213  Similarly, in Xuncax, the court 
addressed Judge Bork’s and Judge Edward’s concurrences in Tel-Oren and 
held that the TVPA ratified Filártiga’s approach to the ATS and that the 
ATS was not simply jurisdictional, but also enabled plaintiffs to sue for 
“harms [that] were committed upon them in violation of international law or 
a treaty of the United States.”214 
Two other cases not fully resolved during this period produced very 
important opinions dealing with some of the same questions.  A case 
against the former dictator of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, and his 
daughter, Imee Marcos-Manotoc, who oversaw military intelligence, 
produced a default judgment against Marcos-Manotoc (who failed to 
appear) for the kidnapping, torture, and death of a student based on his 
political beliefs.215  A district court in Hawai’i awarded his mother $4.16 
million in damages and attorneys’ fees under Philippine law.216  The Ninth 
Circuit considered whether Marcos-Manotoc was entitled to sovereign 
immunity under the FSIA; whether the ATS did not apply extraterritorially; 
and whether the ATS was “purely . . . jurisdictional” in nature.217  It 
answered “no” to each, reasoning that the acts in question exceeded the 
scope of Marcos-Manotoc’s official authority; that the ATS on its face 
could be applied to foreign defendants and there was no limitation as to the 
“locus of the injury”; and that the ATS recognized municipal torts and thus 
was not purely jurisdictional.218  Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit consolidated 
this case with other cases brought against Marcos and certified a class 
action against his estate, because at that point the dictator had died.219  The 
plaintiffs moved to freeze Marcos’s assets, and the district court 
complied.220  The Estate appealed.221  While the preliminary injunction was 
on appeal, the district court brought the case to trial, and a jury voted on 
February 13, 1994, in favor of the class and awarded the plaintiffs $1.2 
billion in exemplary damages and $766 million in compensatory 
	
 213. Id. 
 214. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 215. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig. (Estate I), 978 F.2d 493, 
495–96 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 216. Id. at 496; Trajano v. Marcos, Nos. 86-Civ-2448, 86-Civ-15039, 1989 WL 76894, at 
*2 (9th Cir. Jul. 10, 1989) (“Marcos is a private citizen residing in the United States.  Neither 
the present government of the Republic of the Philippines nor the United States government 
objects to judicial resolution of these claims, or sees any resulting potential embarrassment 
to any government.  The issues raised, although extraordinarily complex, are within the 
capacity of the courts to resolve.”). 
 217. Estate I, 978 F.2d at 501. 
 218. Id. at 500.  Marcos-Manotoc also made the argument that the extraterritorial 
application of the ATS violated Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 501–03.  The Ninth 
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the “Arising Under” Clause was meant to 
encompass foreign cases and that the United States has the power to incorporate 
international law as part of domestic law. Id. at 499–503. 
 219. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig. (Estate II), 25 F.3d 1467, 
1469 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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damages.222  The Ninth Circuit, in considering the interlocutory appeal of 
the injunction, reached the same conclusions on all of the issues in the 
challenge to the default judgment made by Marcos-Manotoc.223 
The remaining cases were dismissed on various grounds, mostly on the 
basis of sovereign immunity, though three of these suits were brought 
against the United States or an officer of the United States.224  The final 
case, Lafontant v. Aristide,225 was dismissed on the basis of head-of-state 
immunity in a manner that suggested a quite conservative approach to 
international law, if not hostility toward it.  There, Lafontant attempted to 
prevent the newly elected Haitian President, Jean-Betrand Aristide, from 
taking office.226  After the coup failed and Lafontant was jailed, a member 
of the Haitian military executed him, allegedly on the orders of President 
Aristide.227  Two days later, another military coup succeeded, and Aristide 
sought refuge in the United States, which continued to recognize him as 
Haiti’s president.228  Lafontant’s widow sued, and Aristide moved to 
dismiss the case on the ground that, as a sitting head of state, he was 
immune from suit.229  The Department of Justice submitted a statement to 
the court that it would be contrary to then-U.S. foreign policy to hold him 
accountable for the violations that occurred.230  The court held that based 
on principles of comity—which permitted individuals like Prince Charles to 
avoid prosecution while in the United States—Aristide should be protected 
from liability under both the ATS and the TVPA.231  The only means of 
overcoming such immunity would be if the foreign state itself did not 
recognize the leader as the legitimate head of state or if the U.S. executive 
branch similarly recognized the leader as illegitimate.232  Such was not the 
situation here.233  Finally, two other courts granted motions to dismiss on 
	
 222. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 223. Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1470–76. 
 224. Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 967 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(dismissing claims against the United States for failing to provide adequate police protection 
to civilians during its occupation of Panama, which “damage[d] . . . the property of various 
Panamanian businesses that occurred as a result of looting and rioting in the wake” of the 
invasion); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1329–31 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissing case 
against the United States for misidentifying and shooting down a civilian aircraft during a 
conflict with Iran, killing 290 people); Smith v. Olsen, 76 A.F.T.R.2d 95-6478 (D. Ariz. 
1995) (dismissing suit for IRS’s attempt to collect taxes from a nonresident alien under 
various statutes, including the ATS); Denegri v. Republic of Chile, No. 86-Civ-3085, 1992 
WL 91914, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1992) (dismissing suit against Chile for detaining two 
teenagers, dousing them with gasoline, setting them on fire, and denying them adequate 
medical treatment). 
 225. 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 226. Id. at 130. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 130–31. 
 230. Id. at 131. 
 231. Id. at 131–32, 137–39. 
 232. Id. at 132–33.  The court further held that the FSIA did not alter head-of-state 
immunity. Id. at 137. 
 233. Id. at 134. 
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the basis of failure to state a claim under the law of nations,234 and two 
dismissed ATS cases for undetermined reasons.235 
Of course the case of most importance during this period—which marked 
a sea change in how ATS cases came to be litigated—was the Second 
Circuit’s unanimous opinion in Kadic.  The Second Circuit consolidated 
cases brought by two groups of plaintiffs alleging that the President of the 
self-proclaimed and unrecognized Bosnian-Serb country of “Srpska” 
controlled military forces that committed “genocide, rape, forced 
prostitution and impregnation, torture and other cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex and ethnic inequality, 
summary execution, and wrongful death.”236  The Second Circuit held that 
individuals who were not state officials or acting under color of state law 
were capable of being held liable under the ATS—at least for certain 
violations of the law of nations.237  Harmonizing its opinion with Judge 
Edwards’s concurrence in Tel-Oren, which stated that there are a “handful 
of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual 
responsibility,”238 the court broke the allegations into three categories:  “(a) 
genocide, (b) war crimes, and (c) other instances of inflicting death, torture, 
and degrading treatment.”239  It concluded that international law dating 
back to at least World War II prohibited genocide and war crimes not only 
by state actors, but also by private actors.240  It stated that prohibitions 
against torture under the law of nations applied only to state officials or 
actors acting under color of law.241  The court also rejected Karadžić’s 
argument that the claims were nonjusticiable under the political question or 
act of state doctrine and, at the behest of the United States, considered the 
possibility of a dismissal based on forum non conveniens.242  It concluded:  
“[T]he courts of the former Yugoslavia, either in Serbia or war-torn Bosnia, 
are not now available to entertain plaintiffs’ claims, even if circumstances 
concerning the location of witnesses and documents were presented that 
were sufficient to overcome the plaintiffs’ preference for a United States 
	
 234. Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1417–18 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
misrepresentation of the bank’s financial health and insider “looting” of funds did not 
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claims brought by Filipino sailors against their former employer, see Castillo v. Spiliada 
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 236. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 237. Id. at 236–39. 
 238. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring). 
 239. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241. 
 240. Id. at 241–43. 
 241. Id. at 243. 
 242. Id. at 250–51. 
1096 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
forum.”243  The court thus demonstrated a high willingness to engage 
international law and was quite liberal in its interpretation of it. 
C.  From Kadic to Sosa 
The period from the Second Circuit’s opinion in Kadic until the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sosa was characterized by a lower rate of success for 
plaintiffs in terms of judgments obtained against individuals, but also by a 
rise in suits against corporations.244  However, judicial resolutions of suits 
against corporations and private entities were not reflected in new dismissal 
doctrines.  In fact, there were few significant developments in these 
doctrines until Sosa itself.  Courts still grappled with which harms were 
actionable under the law of nations, forming an enlarged list, albeit one 
with some surprising exceptions.  Sovereign immunity continued to be 
another principal means of dismissal.  Some decisions on this ground 
demonstrated reluctance to interfere with foreign affairs, treating it as the 
province of the executive.  Nevertheless, the United States was usually a 
party to these actions rather than an amicus or intervenor attempting to 
prevent U.S. courts from sitting in judgment on foreign officials, including 
ex-heads of state.  As such, these decisions only indicate a desire to protect 
the government from actions initiated by aliens rather than a reluctance to 
engage human rights abuses abroad because they had nothing to do with the 
United States and were too “foreign.”  One wrinkle that emerged during the 
post-Kadic period, likely a hangover from the passage of the TVPA, was 
the insertion of certain TVPA requirements into the ATS.  Theoretically, 
this could be read as manifesting “isolationism,” but it better reflects the 
rise of textualism trickling down from the Supreme Court and the perceived 
importance of preemption. 
The most important factor for dismissal during this period, like 1980 to 
1992, but unlike 1992 to 1995, was the type of harm alleged by the plaintiff 
and exactly how egregious it was.  Among the cases thrown out under the 
law of nations limitation, a few types are intuitive—for example, those 
alleging antitrust violations, in particular price-fixing,245 or alleging 
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violations of domestic statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the 
Fair Labor Standards Act246 (FLSA).  More significantly, courts rejected 
allegations of environmental destruction or health scourges caused by 
massive pollution—even if these harms resulted in wide-scale displacement 
of communities or destruction of indigenous culture—because such norms 
were deemed either insufficiently definite or insufficiently universal to 
qualify.247  And, as in other periods, at least one case was dismissed based 
on allegations that it resulted in property loss.248  Cases that were not 
dismissed on this ground were based, for example, on acts of torture, 
extrajudicial killing, arbitrary detention, war crimes (surprisingly, including 
expropriation of property),249 or forced labor. 
Another important means of dismissal was that of sovereign immunity.  
Three of the five cases dismissed on this ground were brought against 
sovereign states:  the United States,250 Israel,251 and Iran.252  A sixth 
additional case considered a novel argument, presented in a suit against 
Libya for its role in the suitcase bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, that a jus cogens violation “constitute[d] an implied waiver 
within the meaning of the FSIA.”253  The suit was not premised under the 
ATS—as many of its victims were U.S. citizens—but drew on the analogy 
to Kadic.254  The plaintiffs alleged that because a jus cogens norm, such as 
a norm against extrajudicial killing, is a mandatory norm “recognized by 
the international community as a norm from which no derogation is 
	
 246. See, e.g., Wong-Opasi v. Tenn. State Univ., Nos. 99-5658, 99-5660, slip. op. at 2 
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under the law of nations), aff’d, 33 F. App’x 705 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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 248. Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004) 
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 249. Two cases alleging expropriation of property were dismissed on sovereign immunity 
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 253. Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
 254. Id. at 241. 
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permitted,” no immunity by definition can attach.255  The Second Circuit 
rejected this argument based on its interpretation of Congress’s intent in 
drafting the FSIA.256  Another suit brought against a Chinese official for the 
Tiananmen Square massacre was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds 
as the result of the Department of State’s diplomatic arm-twisting.  A judge 
in the Southern District of New York initially found that service of process 
was complete when the papers were served on a member of the Department 
of State’s security detail assigned to protect the official after the court 
issued an order requiring the Department of State to serve the defendant.257  
But the Department of State never did so and afterward asserted that the 
order violated the U.S. government’s sovereign immunity.258  Another 
judge in the same district agreed.259  Finally, in a complicated case that 
involved many defendants both public and private in the context of Chinese 
prison camps where Chinese citizens were allegedly slaves, a district court 
in the District of Columbia ruled that the Bank of China was immune from 
suit and did not fall within the FSIA’s commercial activities exception.260 
A dismissal ground that first manifested during this period was the statute 
of limitations (SOL).  Under the TVPA, plaintiffs must sue for wrongs 
committed against them within ten years of the wrong.261  The text of the 
ATS possesses no such restriction.  Nevertheless, courts in some 
jurisdictions began to read the requirements of the TVPA or § 1983 
(considered an analogous civil rights statute that the court in Kadic 
compared to the ATS) backward into the ATS and imported an SOL 
requirement there as well.262  In particular, courts tended to apply the SOL 
in cases that had to do with wrongs committed far in the past, or at least 
relatively speaking.  Courts dismissed claims related to the Vietnam War,263 
World War II,264 and slavery in the United States.265  Sometimes courts 
also justified these decisions on standing grounds—that is to say courts held 
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that the descendants of victims who suffered abuses were not injured in fact 
and therefore could not sue.266  The remaining grounds for dismissal are not 
prominent enough to warrant addressing. 
The rest of the cases resulted in either victories for the plaintiffs or 
settlements.  These courts awarded the plaintiffs large sums of money:  
$745 million and $4.5 billion, respectively.267  None of the money was 
collected.268  In 1996, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the groundbreaking 
Marcos jury verdict after various aspects of the trial were challenged.269  
Marcos contested a jury instruction that the estate could be held liable if 
Marcos knew the military tortured, summarily executed, and “disappeared” 
the population “and failed to use his power to prevent it.”270  The Ninth 
Circuit ruled that the principle that commanders could be held liable for the 
actions of their subordinates was well established under both U.S. and 
international law.271  The judgment has yet to be collected.272 
Four settlements were also reached, including the first non-Holocaust 
settlement against a corporation.  Seventy-seven cases were brought against 
corporations during this time period, and all were dismissed as to the 
corporate defendants but Doe I v. Reddy.273  In Reddy, a group of Indian 
immigrants, primarily young women, alleged that the Reddy family, which 
owned substantial real estate and ran various businesses in Northern 
California, promised them education and employment if they came to the 
United States; instead they were forced into involuntary servitude and 
sexually and physically abused.274  The case, brought under the ATS for 
cruel and inhuman treatment against the Reddy family and the corporations 
they owned, settled for $8.9 million in April 2004.275  Before declining to 
dismiss the suit at the 12(b)(6) stage, the trial court rejected the defendants’ 
argument that the claims rested on unratified treaty obligations, instead 
concluding that jus cogens norms against slavery were sufficient to render 
the acts violations of the law of nations.276  The court did not consider the 
issue of whether corporations could be held liable under the ATS, simply 
assuming this was the case.277 
Two nondispositive opinions paved the way for corporate liability.  First, 
in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,278 a court in the Southern District 
of New York held that businesses acting in tandem with a government, for 
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example through a conspiracy, could violate the law of nations and thereby 
be held accountable under the ATS.279  Another opinion, issued by the 
Ninth Circuit in 2002, also bolstered support for the theory that 
corporations could be held liable under the ATS.  On appeal in Unocal, the 
Ninth Circuit held that despite the fact that the oil company was a private 
actor, it could be held liable as a nongovernment entity for certain actions—
such as torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings—because they were in 
furtherance of acts (in this case, slavery) that violated the law of nations and 
were actionable if committed by nonstate actors.280  It also held that the oil 
giant could be held accountable for aiding and abetting the Myanmar 
military.281  The Ninth Circuit deemed this holding consistent with Tel-
Oren but vacated the opinion on settlement.282 
The most important case of this period was unquestionably Sosa.283  The 
Supreme Court held that norms recognized as falling under the law of 
nations must be as “well-established” as those “accepted by the civilized 
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-
century paradigms,” such as piracy, violations of safe conduct, and offenses 
against ambassadors.284  Perhaps the most intriguing part of Sosa—which 
both foreshadowed and contradicted the Court’s ruling in Kiobel II—was 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence.  While subscribing to the majority’s 
limitation on the law of nations, he wrote separately addressing principles 
of comity that undergird the ATS.285  Universal jurisdiction, he suggested, 
is appropriate in certain instances involving purely foreign actors, for 
example when they commit genocide, war crimes, or torture and a 
procedural consensus exists such that these crimes could be tried anywhere 
in the world.286  He implied, however, that holding foreign actors liable for 
actions outside the United States might be inconsistent with respect for the 
sovereignty of other states where the norms raise the possibility of 
conflicting with foreign laws.287  He concluded that in Sosa’s case—where 
foreign actors arrested Sosa in another country—the lack of a procedural 
consensus around the illegality of the action “provide[d] additional support 
for the Court’s conclusion that the ATS [did] not recognize . . . underlying 
substantive claim[s] . . . outside the United States, of a citizen of one 
foreign country by another.”288 
Properly read, Sosa is not isolationist.  A better reading is that Sosa 
actively engages principles of international law, but does so in a 
conservative and cautious manner.  Sosa actively proclaims that the ATS is 
	
 279. Id. at *1313.  The case later settled in 2009. 
 280. Unocal II, 395 F.3d 932, 944–56 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per stipulation en 
banc, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 281. Id. at 954–56. 
 282. Id. at 945. 
 283. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 284. Id. at 692, 694. 
 285. Id. at 761 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 286. Id. at 761–62. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 763. 
2015] MEASURING TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1101 
not “stillborn,” meaning that it permits a “claim for relief without a further 
statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action.”289  The justices 
may have intended to narrow the type of actionable claims by cabining the 
definition of the law of nations.  There are certainly many claims under 
treaties that courts do not recognize as creating such a norm, and Sosa did 
nothing to dispel, and in fact amplified, opposition to causes of actions 
based on treaties alone.  Sosa merely insisted that claims brought under the 
ATS be jus cogens violations—namely violations with a strong 
international consensus against them. 
D.  From Sosa to Kiobel II 
Sosa, in tandem with Wiwa and Unocal, ushered in a new era in ATS 
litigation—but not always in the manner currently understood.  Scholars are 
right that this period was one of the hardest for ATS practitioners and 
reflected a narrower approach to certain doctrines.290  Nevertheless, such 
narrowing did not prevent many positive developments for plaintiffs from 
taking place, including extremely large corporate settlements. 
At least four notable trends manifested during this period.  First, the 
prediction that Sosa would shake the ATS at its foundation proved false:  
the list of actionable claims actually expanded even though the overall 
dismissal rate was higher.  And Sosa left untouched core causes of action, 
imposing only a requirement that the harm suffered must be factually severe 
enough to support one or more of them.  A new, unstudied change in this 
doctrine in certain circuits, however, had to do with secondary liability.  
Plaintiffs depended on theories of secondary liability, such as aiding and 
abetting the state in its perpetration of human rights violations, to 
circumvent the rule that private actors cannot commit violations of the law 
of nations through extrajudicial killings and torture that would otherwise 
only qualify as wrongful death or assault.  Certain courts now held that 
claims against corporations based on such theories must allege purpose 
instead of knowledge on the issue of intent. 
Second, the hydraulics within the doctrine of sovereign immunity shifted.  
Courts began holding government officers—as opposed to agencies such as 
government banks—immune under the FSIA on the basis that they 
	
 289. Id. at 714. 
 290. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 13, at 1511.  During this period, over two and a half 
times more cases were resolved than from 1995 to 2004, for a total of 160, excluding 
frivolous and pro se cases.  The massive increase in litigation is largely attributed to the rise 
of suits against corporations.  Indeed, of these 160 suits, sixty-eight (42 percent) saw 
corporations as defendants.  Comparable figures from earlier periods show a lower 
magnitude:  for example, from 1995 through 2004 only twenty-seven suits against corporate 
defendants were resolved, and twenty-seven additional opinions were issued.  But while 
more claims were brought, more claims were shunted.  One hundred twenty-seven out of the 
160 cases (79 percent) resolved in favor of defendants.  Of the remaining cases, one motion 
to dismiss was denied, eleven default judgments were granted, five trials led to verdicts for 
the plaintiffs, and summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs in the final case.  Twelve 
cases settled.  One case was a split decision for the plaintiff and defendant.  The remaining 
cases had unknown outcomes or were dismissed voluntarily. 
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qualified as state instrumentalities.  The Supreme Court rejected this 
approach in 2010 but left the door ajar for the application of common law 
immunity to state officials.291 
Third, this period experienced a huge takeoff in the number of suits 
against corporations.  Only two judgments—both default judgments—held 
a corporation liable under the ATS.292  But this period saw a number of 
important settlements, including Wiwa and Unocal.  Toward the end of the 
period, a debate emerged over whether a corporation could be considered a 
“person” under international law.  There were also some developments in 
TVPA jurisprudence relating to the aiding and abetting question.  Finally, 
of course, the Supreme Court handed down Kiobel II. 
Based on Sosa’s narrowing of violations amounting to those under the 
law of nations, one would expect a narrower range of cases dismissed on 
this ground.  One hypothesis is that claimants initially sued for breaches of 
commercial contract or fraud or other economic torts in the wake of 
Filártiga’s cryptic methodology of defining the law of nations, which lower 
courts struggled with for years.  Prior to Sosa, the most successful claims 
tended to be Holocaust related (though some of these failed) or alleged 
genocide, war crimes, extrajudicial killing, disappearance, “official” torture, 
arbitrary detention, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, or forced 
labor.  After Sosa, the list broadened to include proxies of terrorist acts293 
and human experimentation.294  On the other hand, claims dismissed post-
Sosa include terrorism itself,295 child custody,296 slavery in the nineteenth 
century,297 failure to compensate wartime destruction of property,298 private 
	
 291. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 308, 324 (2010). 
 292. See supra note 123. 
 293. See, e.g., Mwani v. Bin Ladin, No. 99-Civ-125, 2006 WL 3422208, at *4–5 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 28, 2006) (handing down default judgment to a class of five thousand Kenyans who 
were the victims of a terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, because the act violated 
“the rights of ambassadors,” without questioning the plaintiffs’ standing to bring such 
claims). 
 294. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 295. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(dismissing claims under the ATS because terrorism was not an established violation of the 
law of nations and a TVPA claim because it was not committed under color of state law). 
 296. See, e.g., Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 776, 782 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding cross-
border child abduction did not violate the law of nations, and considerations of comity with 
the Dominican Republic precluded suit). 
 297. See, e.g., Hereros ex rel. Riruako v. Deutsche Afrika-Linien Gmblt & Co., 232 F. 
App’x 90, 93–95 (3d Cir. 2007) (relying on Sosa’s definition of the law of nations to 
conclude that, despite the court’s inclination to view slavery from 1899 to 1915 as a 
violation of the law of nations, a “mere inclination” did not “support a cause of action in [its] 
reading of Sosa”). 
 298. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 854–55 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (citing Sosa to dismiss a suit against the United States without addressing the 
question of sovereign immunity for bombing a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in the 
mistaken belief that the plant supplied Al Qaeda and failing to provide compensation for 
such destruction). 
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torture,299 and the use of toxic chemicals in areas with civilians, among 
others.300 
Courts did dismiss claims post-Sosa that might have qualified as 
violations under the law of nations had they been “severe” enough.  For 
example, in Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,301 Judge Posner, 
writing for the Seventh Circuit, held that allegations of forced child labor on 
a Liberian rubber plantation “while bad, [were] not that bad” and therefore 
did not violate the law of nations.302  This was because “[a]griculture is the 
sector with the most child labourers [sic] . . . [and] also the sector with the 
most potential for decent work for rural children and young adolescents 
who have reached the legal minimum age of employment.”303  Additional 
cases ruled out what would have otherwise qualified as violations of the law 
of nations or torture or extrajudicial killing if the facts alleged had 
supported the claims.304 
Another extremely important question that arose during this period was 
whether aiding and abetting governments in committing violations of the 
law of nations was actionable.  Such aiding and abetting claims formed the 
basis for most corporate liability lawsuits:  plaintiffs rarely alleged that 
corporations themselves committed acts of torture or extrajudicial killings, 
known as “direct liability,” because courts usually held such that customary 
international law only recognized torture and extrajudicial killing 
committed under color of law.305  As a result, most victims of corporate 
human rights abuses alleged that corporations aided and abetted regimes in 
the country where the violation occurred.  Courts were split on the degree 
of intent necessary for such aiding and abetting claims.  For example, as the 
Ninth Circuit held in Unocal, the standard for aiding and abetting was 
“knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect 
on the perpetration of the crime.”306  Both the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits 
agreed the standard was “knowing.”307  Other courts disagreed, holding a 
	
 299. See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that 
claims that a private military contractor committed torture abroad did not violate the law of 
nations because the contractor was not acting under color of law, and therefore its actions 
merely constituted assault and battery). 
 300. See, e.g., Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 
104, 109 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing claim for wartime use of chemical that caused civilian 
deaths and injuries because its purpose was to destroy forests used to disguise the Viet 
Cong). 
 301. 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 302. Id. at 1023. 
 303. Id. at 1024 (basing this holding on a motion for judgment on the pleadings that was 
converted into a motion for summary judgment). 
 304. E.g., Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-Civ-50, 2011 WL 3820711, at *1 (E.D. Va. 
Aug. 26, 2011) (dismissing suit under TVPA because allegations of physical abuse did not 
amount to torture). 
 305. See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 306. Unocal II, 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per stipulation en 
banc, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 307. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 Fed. 
App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157–60 (11th Cir. 
2005). 
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claim under the law of nations for aiding and abetting must allege purpose 
to constitute a violation of customary international law and, thereby, a 
violation of the law of nations as well.308  In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.309 (Kiobel I), Judge Pierre N. Leval concurred in the 
judgment, asserting that the degree of mens rea, based on customary 
international law under an aiding and abetting theory, must be purpose.310 
Many other cases were dismissed on the ground of immunity doctrines, 
including sovereign immunity, diplomatic immunity, and head-of-state 
immunity.  A few such actions were brought against governments despite 
Amerada Hess, though often these suits included state officials or other 
parties as defendants.  Courts began to address whether state officers were 
immune under the FSIA or if the FSIA only applied to states and their 
instrumentalities.  Some courts held—in tension with Filártiga—that state 
officers qualified as state instrumentalities when acting in their official 
capacities under “color of law” or that if the state “ratified” their actions, 
sovereign immunity applied.311  Other courts, including those in the Second 
Circuit, reached similar conclusions—again in tension with Filártiga—on a 
common law basis.312  Many of the cases were against an officer of a 
government allied with the United States—such as Israel—while officials 
of other countries did not receive this type of protection.  In the Supreme 
Court’s third decision treating the ATS, the 2010 case Samantar v. 
Yousuf,313 the Court unanimously rejected the FSIA argument but left the 
door open to the possibility that these officials might be protected by 
common law immunity.314 
In certain ATS cases against U.S. officers, courts have held that the 
Westfall Act315 allows the United States to substitute itself as the defendant 
when the acts in question occurred within the scope of an officer’s 
employment, thereby barring suit under the domestic law doctrine of 
	
 308. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247–48 
(2d Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for a corporation 
that allegedly provided assistance to the government of Sudan in committing genocide and 
war crimes because the plaintiffs could not prove the company acted with the purpose of 
harming Sudanese citizens); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(adopting the Second Circuit’s reasoning). 
 309. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 310. Id. at 158 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 311. E.g., Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (dismissing a suit 
against the head of Israeli Army Intelligence brought by victims of the Israeli bombing in 
Lebanon in which the State Department submitted a letter to the court). 
 312. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14–15 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding, in the context of 
another suit against an Israeli officer, that “in the common-law context, we defer to the 
Executive’s determination of the scope of immunity”). 
 313. 560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
 314. Id. at 308, 324. 
 315. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall) Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2679 (2012) (allowing the United States to substitute itself as a defendant in most 
tort claims brought against government officers acting within the scope of their 
employment). 
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sovereign immunity.316  Other courts recognized diplomatic immunity, even 
if diplomats were not committing crimes in their diplomatic capacity.317  As 
in previous periods, sitting heads of state were immune even when the acts 
were committed prior to assuming their presidencies.318 
Far less significant, grounds for dismissing lawsuits from Sosa to Kiobel 
II included personal jurisdiction (some for inadequate service of process 
and some for insufficient minimum contacts with the forum in question), 
forum non conveniens, the political question doctrine, the state secrets 
privilege, and preemption.  Finally, this period witnessed the first pushback 
against corporate liability under the ATS.  For a decade and a half, courts 
assumed corporate liability attached under the law of nations.  The Second 
Circuit itself deemed corporations subject to the law of nations nine times 
prior to Kiobel I.319  In Kiobel I, however, the Second Circuit changed 
course.  In a 2-1 opinion, the majority found that while corporations are 
considered persons under domestic law, they are not persons under 
international law, and hence there is no jurisdiction over them under the 
statute.320  The court held that the word “persons” must be interpreted under 
international law rather than domestic law, and because no successful suit 
had been brought against a corporation per se, despite the World War II 
Industrialist Cases, which held that the leaders of businesses that supported 
the Nazis could be criminally liable under international law,321 no norm 
established liability.322  Other circuits such as the Eleventh Circuit 
disagreed.323 
With regard to the TVPA, there were several specific grounds for 
dismissal.  First, courts held that its remedies did not apply retroactively.324  
	
 316. See, e.g., Sobitan v. Glud, 589 F.3d 379, 388–89 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
Westfall Act applies to claims under the ATS that are brought pursuant to a treaty); Rasul v. 
Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that torture of suspected terrorists 
was within the scope of employment), aff’d sub nom. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009). 
 317. See, e.g., Devi v. Silva, 861 F. Supp. 2d 135, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing suit 
against Sri Lankan military commander and diplomat allegedly responsible for the torture 
and killing of an ethnic minority population because the Diplomatic Relations Act entitles 
diplomats to immunity, notwithstanding the ATS and TVPA). 
 318. See, e.g., Habyarimana v. Kagame, 696 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(dismissing suit brought by widows of former Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi against the 
current President of Rwanda for allegedly killing their husbands by shooting down their 
plane with a missile before taking office). 
 319. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254 n.125 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(collecting cases). 
 320. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111, 118–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the standard employed 
under the ATS must be that of customary international law and further finding that, under 
this standard, there is no norm, much less a universal one, to support corporate liability under 
the ATS), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 321. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:  A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 477 (2001) (discussing post-World War II criminal 
prosecutions of the leaders of large German corporations for aiding slave labor and 
deportation). 
 322. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 131–42. 
 323. See, e.g., Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 324. See Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1099–100 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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Second, courts dismissed suits brought by persons other than the victim or 
on behalf of the victim (i.e., a “representative or administrator of [the 
victim’s] estate”)325 despite the fact that the wording of the statute 
authorizes suits by “a claimant in an action for wrongful death.”326  
Additionally, many courts held that the TVPA did not protect victims from 
defendants who were not individuals, meaning it did not protect them from 
corporations, states, or nonstate entities even if these entities aided and 
abetted individuals in committing their acts under color of state law.327  In 
2012, the Supreme Court supported this conclusion in a case involving a 
victim allegedly tortured and killed at the hands of the PLO, ruling that the 
word “individual” as opposed to “person” used in the TVPA meant that 
private actors such as the PLO could not be held liable.328 
Despite this doctrinal stiffening, plaintiffs prevailed in several cases 
under both the ATS and the TVPA—including two default judgments on 
the issue of human trafficking and forced labor that led to awards of $13.5 
million and $7.6 million, respectively.329  One of two standing judgments 
against corporations was handed down in 2008, before the Second Circuit’s 
Kiobel I decision holding that corporations could not be liable for violations 
of the law of nations.  The complaint alleged that a U.S. forestry company 
induced numerous workers to come from Guatemala on the promise of H-2 
visas and then confiscated their passports and made them work in harsh 
conditions without adequate health care or remuneration.330  Other default 
judgments included a $47 million victory against the former Honduran 
military intelligence chief for torture and disappearances,331 a $10 million 
award against an El Salvadorian former security chief who acted under 
color of law in assassinating an Archbishop while he was giving mass,332 
and a default judgment for approximately $8.6 million on the basis of the 
kidnapping and arbitrary detention of the Acting President of the American 
University of Beirut by Hezbollah.333  In addition, TVPA claims 
contributed to summary judgment for hundreds of millions of dollars for the 
1989 bombing of a flight from Brazzaville, Congo, to Paris by Libyan 
	
 325. Fisher v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 541 F. Supp. 2d 46, 54–
55 n.10 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 326. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)(2) (2012). 
 327. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissing 
TVPA claims against oil company for allegedly paying the Nigerian military to attack 
victims on an offshore platform). 
 328. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709–10 (2012). 
 329. Magnifico v. Villanueva, No. 10-Civ-80771, 2012 WL 5395026, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
Nov. 2, 2012) (awarding judgment in case alleging causes of action under RICO, the 
TVPRA, the FLSA, and state law, in addition to the ATS and TVPA); Aguilar v. Imperial 
Nurseries, No. 07-Civ-00193, 2008 WL 2572250, at *1–2 (D. Conn. May 28, 2008) 
(granting default judgment). 
 330. Complaint at 182–89, 257–64, Aguilar, 2007 WL 1183549 (elaborating facts alleged 
against the company). 
 331. Reyes v. Grijalba, 02-cv-22046 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2006). 
 332. Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 
 333. Dodge v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-Civ-252, 2004 WL 5353873, at *5 
(D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2004) (assigning damages not only under the TVPA, but also under the 
Flatow Amendment with jurisdiction arising under the FSIA). 
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officials that killed all 170 passengers, including seven U.S. citizens, 
despite the fact that certain courts had held the application of the TVPA was 
not retroactive.334  Jury trials also resulted in verdicts for plaintiffs, 
including in a case for torture and extrajudicial killing by El Salvadorian 
soldiers,335 and in a case for arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killing of 
an economist appointed by Chilean President Salvador Allende who was 
overthrown in a military coup d’état.336 
Twelve cases also settled, including seven against corporations, the most 
important of which are Unocal and Wiwa.  Unocal settled in 2005 for $30 
million before the case could be reheard en banc and before Unocal’s 
merger with Chevron.337  Wiwa finally settled in 2009 for $15.5 million.338  
The four other settlements against corporations included two cases against 
security contractors in Iraq brought under the ATS, another brought under 
the TVPA,339 and a case against Yahoo! for allegedly giving the Chinese 
government access to emails of political dissidents who were subsequently 
arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and subjected to cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment.340 
After the Second Circuit in Kiobel I held that corporations were not 
persons under customary international law and therefore could not be liable 
under the ATS, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this question.341  
After oral argument, the Court placed the case back on the calendar and 
instructed the parties to brief “whether and under what circumstances the 
Alien Tort Statute . . . allows courts to recognize a cause of action for 
violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign 
other than the United States.”342  This move was unexpected, but not 
entirely so.  After Kiobel I, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the 
defendants’ identical argument in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC.343  Judge 
	
 334. Pugh v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, No. 02-Civ-02026, 2006 WL 
2384915, at *9 (D.D.C. May 11, 2006). 
 335. Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding jury verdict 
awarding $6 million). 
 336. Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding 
verdict).  The jury awarded Cabello’s survivors $3 million in compensatory damages and $1 
million in punitive damages. Id. 
 337. Goldhaber, supra note 11, at 129. 
 338. Id. at 128. 
 339. Manook v. Unity Res. Grp., No. 10-01970 (4th Cir. Mar. 16, 2011) (dismissing 
appeal pursuant to a voluntary stipulation by the plaintiff); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 
Nos. 1:09-cv-615, 1:09-cv-616, 1:09-cv-617, 1:09-cv-618, 1:09-cv-645 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6, 
2010) (approving confidential settlement agreement). 
 340. Xiaoning v. Yahoo!, No. 4:07-cv-02151 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2007) (dismissing case 
pursuant to settlement). 
 341. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) 
(phrasing the question in terms of corporate immunity); Order Granting Writ in Tandem with 
Mohamad v. Rajoub., Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
 342. Order Restoring the Case to the Calendar for Reargument and Directing the Parties 
to File Supplemental Briefs, Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
 343. 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 
(20013); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold 
that there is no extraterritoriality bar.”). 
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Kleinfeld, joined by Judges Bea and Ikuta, dissented.344  Judge Kleinfeld 
argued that the text or context of a statute must clearly indicate it has 
extraterritorial application for jurisdiction to attach based on the Supreme 
Court’s recent securities jurisprudence.345  The ATS met neither criterion, 
he argued, on the facts of a “foreign cubed” case.346  Judge Kleinfeld 
described the majority’s logic as “a new imperialism, entitling our court[s], 
and not the peoples of other countries, to make the law governing persons 
within those countries” that “now asserts entitlement to make law for all the 
peoples of the entire planet.”347  Nevertheless, at the time the Supreme 
Court ordered reargument in Kiobel II, no court had ruled that the ATS 
lacked extraterritorial application.  The Supreme Court unanimously 
affirmed the Second Circuit on this basis on April 17, 2013.348 
E.  From Kiobel II to the Present 
Only two and a half years have transpired since Kiobel II.  As a result, it 
is impossible to make predictions as to how cases will play out in the long 
run without some degree of speculation.  What can be said is that, despite 
prognostications that the ATS is dead and that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has eliminated any chance of plaintiffs’ prevailing, this 
has not proved true thus far.  Though the predominant means of dismissing 
cases is now the presumption, many of these cases might not have 
succeeded anyway for other reasons, such as an inability to plead purpose in 
aiding and abetting suits against corporations or the gravity of the harms 
alleged.  And many lower courts have taken pains to follow Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence in Kiobel II and interpreted the presumption narrowly, holding 
that exceptions apply when part of the tort has been committed on U.S. 
soil.349  That said, fewer ATS and TVPA cases have been filed since Kiobel 
II than in previous periods,350 suggesting the precedent has deterred 
	
 344. 671 F.3d at 797–818 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
 345. Id. at 803–11 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), a 
securities case, in support of the presumption). 
 346. Id. at 809–11. 
 347. Id. at 798. 
 348. Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013). 
 349. See, e.g., Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding defendant 
liable in an action for default judgment for a truck bomb that exploded at the U.S. embassy 
in Kenya on the ground that the embassy had a sufficient nexus to the United States); Ahmed 
v. Magan, 2:10-Civ-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013) (holding 
that a U.S. citizen who aided and abetted the Somali national security service in torturing 
and committing cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment against the plaintiff was liable in a 
default judgment action), aff’d, 2013 WL 5493032, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2013) (awarding 
$5,000,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages). 
 350. The prevailing wisdom as of April 2014 was that no such cases were filed post-
Kiobel II. See JOHN BELLINGER III & REEVES ANDERSON, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, AS KIOBEL TURNS ONE, ITS EFFECT REMAINS UNCLEAR (2014), http://www.institute 
forlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Kiobel_Anniversary_Paper__April_29_2014_.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/C46F-LVXG].  This is untrue, as can be seen from the following string cite 
that captures all ATS and ATS/TVPA cases filed since Kiobel II by doing a data scrap from 
Bloomberg, where I searched for the section of the U.S. Code in which the ATS resides. See 
Brill v. Chevron Corp., No. 3:15-cv-04916 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015); Dogan v. Barak, No. 
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plaintiffs from pursuing human rights claims under the statute despite 
chances of prevailing if the suit is strong in other respects.  In addition, 
courts have held that Kiobel II leaves the TVPA untouched and that the 
TVPA displaces the presumption against extraterritoriality.351 
As of the date of this Article, sixty ATS and TVPA cases since Kiobel II 
had been fully resolved, with many additional pending cases.  Of the fully 
resolved cases, forty-two (70 percent) were dismissed on a motion to 
dismiss,352 and defendants currently have an 86 percent win rate—the 
highest of any period, but specifically high due to voluntary dismissals.353  
The high level of voluntary dismissals perhaps suggests that plaintiffs are 
being deterred from pursuing cases under the ATS, and indeed newly filed 
cases appear to originate from unseasoned lawyers from the plaintiffs’ bar 
who lack familiarity with the intricacies of the statute. 
The presumption against extraterritoriality was by far the most prominent 
ground invoked in dismissing these cases.  Sixteen of the forty motions to 
dismiss in favor of the defendant (40 percent) were felled by the 
presumption, though many of the dismissals involved other grounds as 
well.354  Many of the cases dismissed under the presumption were “foreign 
cubed” cases, i.e., cases in which the plaintiff was an alien, the defendant 
was foreign, and the tort occurred outside of the territory of the United 
States.  For example, a court in the District of Columbia dismissed a 
complaint alleging that Iranian banks funded a terrorist group responsible 
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AES Corp., No. 1:14-cv-00343 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2014); Tawfik v. Al-Sabah, No. 13 Civ. 
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 351. See, e.g., Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 602 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 352. See supra note 37. 
 353. One default judgment was denied and one was reversed, one jury trial for the 
plaintiff was reversed, one motion for summary judgment on the part of the defendant was 
granted, two cases were dismissed sua sponte, and six groups of plaintiffs voluntarily 
dismissed their ATS claims, though one of the last may have settled.  Two other cases 
settled, which I do not count as victories for the defendant. 
 354. See supra Part II.D; supra Table 1. 
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for the death of civilians in Israel on this basis that the action had no ties 
whatsoever to the United States.355 
Many among the plaintiffs’ bar had hoped that courts would be reluctant 
to dismiss “foreign squared” cases—cases in which the defendant is a U.S. 
citizen—but many such claims have been dismissed, or have at least 
stipulated that U.S. citizenship alone is not dispositive.356  For example, in 
Mujica v. AirScan Inc.,357 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants—both 
U.S. citizens—had “aided and abetted and conspired” with the Colombian 
Air Force in bombing near an oil pipeline to kill insurgents but instead 
killed numerous innocent civilians.358  The court affirmed the dismissal of 
the case, stating that these allegations were based on “speculation” not 
“factual matter, accepted as true” and refused to grant the plaintiffs leave to 
amend.359  Judge Zilly, sitting by designation, dissented in part.360  He 
quoted Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Kiobel II for the proposition that 
“[m]any countries permit foreign plaintiffs to bring suits against their own 
nationals based on unlawful conduct that took place abroad.”361  Judge Zilly 
would have held that nationality of the defendant was enough to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction even where no underlying conduct occurred in 
the United States.362  Had the Mujica plaintiffs made specific allegations 
that met the Iqbal pleading standard without having had the benefit of 
discovery, it is unclear how the Ninth Circuit would have ruled. 
Courts have also considered whether a U.S. citizen’s actions in the 
United States—such as planning or financing—create a sufficient nexus to 
displace the presumption of extraterritoriality.  Most starkly, in Balintulo v. 
Daimler AG,363 the Second Circuit initially rejected the argument adopted 
by the Breyer concurrence and found that “violations of the law of nations 
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States” 
are not actionable “in all cases.”364  It dismissed the plaintiffs’ arguments 
that U.S. corporations’ provision of goods to the South African government 
after apartheid “tie[d] the relevant human rights violations to actions taken 
within the United States” and that the corporations could not be 
“vicariously liable for that conduct under the ATS.”365 
	
 355. Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 185, 205 (D.D.C. 
2013). 
 356. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 595 (“We find that the citizenship or corporate status of the 
defendants can guide us in our navigation of the touch and concern inquiry even though it 
does not firmly secure our jurisdiction.”). 
 357. 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 358. Id. at 584–85, 592. 
 359. Id. at 592. 
 360. Id. at 615–23 (Zilly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 361. Id. at 618 (quoting Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1675 (2013) (Breyer J., concurring)). 
 362. Id. at 617. 
 363. 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 364. Id. at 189–92. 
 365. Id. at 188 (denying the defendants’ writ of mandamus and remanding to the district 
court so the defendants could “seek the dismissal of all of the plaintiffs’ claims, and prevail, 
prior to discovery, through a motion for judgment on the pleadings”).  On remand, the 
district court ruled that any amendments to the complaint would be futile because the 
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Yet some cases might be able to sufficiently allege a nexus if they 
involved “much greater contact with the United States government, 
military, citizens, and territory.”366  The best hope for ATS plaintiffs lies in 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, 
Inc.367  Al Shimari dealt with a Virginia-based private security contractor, 
CACI, and its involvement in Abu Ghraib.368  It treated the company’s 
interrogators and the “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses [they] 
inflicted on several detainees,” which included being “‘repeatedly beaten,’ 
‘shot in the leg,’ ‘repeatedly shot in the head with a taser gun,’ ‘subjected to 
mock execution,’ ‘threatened with unleashed dogs,’ ‘stripped naked,’ ‘kept 
in a cage,’ ‘beaten on [the] genitals with a stick,’ ‘forcibly subjected to 
sexual acts,’ and ‘forced to watch’ the ‘rape[ ][of] a female detainee.’”369  
According to the plaintiffs, CACI “failed to hire suitable interrogators, 
insufficiently supervised CACI employees, ignored reports of abuse, and 
attempted to ‘cover up’ the misconduct.”370  The Fourth Circuit held that 
the phrase “relevant conduct” used by the Supreme Court in Kiobel II was 
not coextensive with the term “claims.”371  In this case the claims had a 
sufficient nexus because they “allege[d] acts of torture committed by 
United States citizens who were employed by an American corporation, 
CACI, which has corporate headquarters located in Fairfax County, 
Virginia,” “[t]he alleged torture occurred at a military facility operated by 
United States government personnel,” “the employees who allegedly 
participated in the acts of torture were hired by CACI in the United States 
to fulfill the terms of a contract that CACI executed with the United States 
Department of the Interior . . . [that] required CACI interrogators . . . to 
obtain security clearances from the United States Department of Defense,” 
and, most importantly, “allege[d] that CACI’s managers located in the 
United States were aware of reports of misconduct abroad, attempted to 
‘cover up’ the misconduct, and ‘implicitly, if not expressly, encouraged’ 
it.”372 
	
defendants could not establish a sufficient nexus to the United States as the “relevant 
conduct”—namely the defendants’ financial support of apartheid—did not support 
jurisdiction because the actions in question were committed by their South African 
subsidiaries.  In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d 331, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that, in fact, IBM’s design of products used by the 
South African regime did “touch and concern” the United States but there were insufficient 
allegations of purpose to meet the aiding and abetting requirement. Balintulo v. Ford Motor 
Co., 796 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 366. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. at 338. 
 367. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).  Note that the case was remanded to the lower court, 
where it was dismissed on the basis that the U.S. military was so intertwined with the 
contractors that the case was a nonjusticiable political question. See Al Shimari v. CACI 
Premier Tech., Inc., No. 1:08-Civ-00827, 2015 WL 4740217, at *9 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2015).  
The case is currently on appeal with respect to this holding. 
 368. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520. 
 369. Id. at 521. 
 370. Id. at 522. 
 371. Id. at 527. 
 372. Id. at 528–29. 
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Nevertheless, even if plaintiffs successfully allege contact between the 
United States and the claim, they may face heightened evidentiary burdens 
as they progress to summary judgment or if the court conducts jurisdictional 
discovery.  For example, in Doe v. Drummond Co.,373 the court treated the 
coal giant’s alleged direct and indirect payments to the Colombian terrorist 
group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) to provide “security” for 
the company’s operations and was “fully aware” of the group’s terrorist 
designation.374  The “arrangement” between Drummond and AUC, which 
was nominally to eliminate guerilla groups that threatened the mines, 
allegedly resulted in war crimes, extrajudicial killings, and crimes against 
humanity.375  On a motion for summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that the plaintiff’s evidence of “general” contacts between Drummond 
and AUC—which included testimony that Drummond’s president and other 
Drummond employees “consent[ed]” to fund the AUC and even to the 
murders themselves—was insufficient to overcome the presumption.376  
The court held that more specific evidence that the company’s actions were 
“directed at” the violations was required to displace the presumption.377  
Drummond suggests that, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant’s 
intent is a factor in considering the presumption despite the court’s explicit 
statement that the standard for aiding and abetting is knowledge.378 
Indeed, even as the presumption takes center stage, a debate still rages 
over the intent requirement to aid, abet, or conspire under the law of 
nations.  The Second Circuit recently ratcheted up the evidentiary 
requirement for the touch and concern test, but also sub silencio left the 
door ajar for aiding and abetting claims based entirely on relevant aiding 
and abetting conduct that occurs in the territorial bounds of the United 
States.  In Mastafa v. Chevron Corp.,379 the Second Circuit held that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over allegations that the U.S.-based oil 
company enabled the government of Saddam Hussein by paying the regime 
kickbacks that financed the torture and killing of innocent Iraqis.380  First, 
the relevant conduct, namely “conduct [that] constitutes a violation of the 
law of nations or aiding and abetting such a violation,” must touch and 
concern the United States to displace the presumption of 
extraterritoriality.381  Second, the court imposed a new requirement:  the 
court must “glimpse” the merits of the aiding and abetting allegation, going 
beyond the Iqbal pleading standard “[w]here a complaint alleges domestic 
conduct of the defendant” and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction if it does not touch and concern the United States with 
	
 373. 782 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 374. Id. at 580–81. 
 375. Id. at 579–80. 
 376. Id. at 599. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 609 (“Accordingly, as reflected in our controlling precedent, the appropriate 
standard for aiding and abetting liability is knowing substantial assistance.”). 
 379. 770 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 380. Id. at 174–76. 
 381. Id. at 186. 
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sufficient force to displace the presumption.382  The panel also held that the 
citizenship of the defendant did not matter—only whether the actions, in 
this case the aiding and abetting, occurred in the United States.383  The 
panel went on to hold that the conduct here—i.e., Chevron’s alleged 
financing of the Hussein dictatorship and the recoupment of oil in its 
stead—had occurred in the United States and therefore met the 
extraterritoriality requirement.384  The relevant inquiry was whether the 
conduct that touched and concerned the United States was the same conduct 
that allegedly violated the law of nations, which can include aiding and 
abetting.385  Nevertheless, the court concluded that the complaint in 
Mastafa must be dismissed because Chevron did not possess the purpose to 
aid and abet the human rights violations committed by the regime, only 
knowledge of such violations.386 
With regard to sovereign immunity and other doctrines used to dismiss 
cases during this period, there were deviations from prior decisions.  
Perhaps the one exception was the application of common law sovereign 
immunity to two former Pakistani officials linked to a terrorist bombing in 
Mumbai.387  There, a Second Circuit panel followed the executive’s 
exhortations to grant immunity on the basis that a finding of liability would 
jeopardize relationships in the region.388  Other dismissal doctrines did not 
materially change from their previous contours, with the possible exception 
of personal jurisdiction, which, pursuant to the 2014 decision Daimler AG 
v. Bauman,389 required plaintiffs to have specific contacts to the forum state 
if the claim relied on a foreign company’s subsidiary.390 
CONCLUSION 
Courts in the United States may be increasingly difficult places to pursue 
human rights claims.  Indeed, they may not be the best, or the least bad, fora 
to litigate such suits given the lack of enforcement with respect to 
judgments and the high dismissal rate.  Yet all is not lost.  The data show 
that human rights suits are modest, but less so than believed.  On the one 
hand, it is true that suits against individuals produced almost no enforceable 
judgments.  On the other hand, suits against corporations have proven 
lucrative.  And the fact that the number of dismissals of these suits has 
remained relatively static, hovering around 65 to 80 percent, suggests that 
explanations of a growing hostility toward international law driving 
dismissals are misplaced.  At the very least, plaintiffs have the ability to 
plead around them as they have mutated not only the types of claims they 
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 387. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 Fed. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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 389. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 390. Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, 2014 WL 1669873, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014). 
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bring, but also the parties against which they bring them and the theories of 
liability they rely on, such as the rise of cases alleging aiding and abetting. 
It is true that the presumption of extraterritoriality has become the 
dominant mode of disposing cases post-Kiobel II.  The rise of the 
presumption does evince a degree of isolationism—the idea that U.S. law 
should not apply to govern the world.  Though nominally the case is 
premised on statutory interpretation and the legislative history of the ATS, 
it is difficult to state with a straight face that this was the “reason” the Court 
overturned the entire line of ATS jurisprudence since Filártiga and the 
universal consensus that the ATS applied to cases involving actions 
committed abroad by foreigners.  More likely, the case was premised on the 
increasing prominence of the ATS and a reluctance to use the ATS as 
capaciously as it was previously deployed.  Yet, Justice Breyer’s Kiobel II 
concurrence combined with Justice Kennedy’s opinion suggests there is still 
hope—and possibly a majority of the Justices—who believe that jus cogens 
violations committed abroad can be litigated under the ATS if not through 
other means. 
Given the grounds under which ATS suits have been dismissed, a core 
group of essential cases has emerged.  These cases involve egregious 
harms—typically harms like torture or extrajudicial killing—and they have 
a connection to the United States, however slim.  For example, in the 
Marcos case, the family was exiled in Hawai’i.391  The defendant in 
Filártiga was domiciled in Brooklyn when proceedings were initiated.392  
This may be enough of a nexus to the United States to displace the 
presumption.393  Unocal also would likely fall in this category—assuming it 
could meet the aiding intent standard.  As ATS doctrines have shifted and 
witnessed the growth of suits against corporations—indeed the least modest 
aspect of the ATS—plaintiffs’ attorneys may adapt and bring cases against 
these types defendants just as plaintiffs’ attorneys adapted to changes in 
ATS doctrines over the past five periods.  There are not enough data post-
Kiobel II to make a solid prediction as to whether such settlements will 
continue, but the pushback by lower courts and evident sympathy toward 
plaintiffs’ plights suggests it is premature to say that the ATS or TVPA are 
dead.  It is unlikely that these suits are a panacea to human rights 
violations—but then again, they never have been. 
The best hope lies in creative, factually rigorous pleading and careful 
case selection.  It may also lie in developing other transnational doctrines to 
buttress against the presumption.  For example, a recent collaborative effort 
between human rights attorneys in Washington, D.C., and Nigerian lawyers 
under another obscure federal statute, the Foreign Legal Assistance Act,394 
	
 391. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 495 
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enabled plaintiffs who had suffered harm through Chevron’s gas flaring in 
Nigeria to secure evidence of Chevron’s operations in the United States, 
which they then provided to the Nigerian lawyers.  The case—which likely 
would not even have been actionable under the ATS—settled.395  Kiobel II 
may indicate hostility at the Supreme Court level, but lower courts have 
their doors open to these techniques, and the data speak to the fundamental 
resilience of transnational human rights. 
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